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Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory
Model for Defining "Discrimination"
CHARLES

F.

ABERNATHY*

In recent years confusion has surrounded the proper interpretation of
title VI ofthe Civr1 Rights Act of1964., which prohibits discrimination in
programs receivingfederalfinancial assistance. Some courts have held
that the title prohibits only intentional discrimination. Others have held
that it proscribes actions having discriminatory tffects as well, an interpretation that imposes a great burden on federal grantees. The
Supreme Court heightened the confusion whenjive individualjustices in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke questioned the propriety of the Court's earlier adoption of an "tff"ects, test for title VL
Professor Abernathy argues that this confusion results from a misdirected inquiry on the part ofthe courts. After a comprehensive review of
pertinent legislative history, Professor Abernathy concludes that Congress did not intend title VI to require either an "intenr or an "if.fects,,
test. Instead, Congress accepted a compromise position, delegating the
definition of discrimination to the administrative agency responsible for
implementating each ajfectedprogram. As a result ofhis analysis, Professor Abernathy suggests standards under which agencies should adopt
regulatory decisions.

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 bans discrimination based on race,
color, or national origin in any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance. Although Congress passed title VI during a period of intense concern with public school desegregation, the statute encompasses not only education but also every other area of federal concern, from agriculture to
transportation. 2 Title VI also has served as a model for recent legislation banning other forms of discrimination, including that based on sex, 3 mental and
physical handicap,4 and age. 5 Moreover, because a great number of privately
controlled organizations, as well as state and local governments, now receive
• Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1969, J.D. 1973, Harvard
University. The author expresses appreciation to those colleagues who co=ented on his ideas, and
particularly to Roy Schotland who criticized Part III of this article.
I. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
2. Most federal cabinet-level departments have promulgated regulations under title VI to govern the
funding programs that each administers. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.1-.143 (1981) (Agriculture); 15 C.F.R.
§§ 8.1-.15 (1981) (Co=erce); 22 C.F.R. §§ 141.1-.12 (1980) (State); 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.12 (1981) (Housing and Urban Development); 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.1-.540 (1980) (Justice); 29 C.F.R. §§ 31.1-.12 (1980)
(Labor); 32 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.14 (1980) (Defense); 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.1-.13 (1981) (Education); 43 C.F.R.
§§ 17.1-.12 (1980) (Interior); 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-.13 (1980) (Health and Human Services); 49 C.F.R.
§§ 21.1-.23 (1980) (Transportation). The Department of the Treasury apparently has failed to adopt
such regulations.
3. See Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (repeating language of title VI to
ban sex discrimination in certain educational programs).
4. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979) (repeating language of title VI to
ban discrimination against handicapped in programs receiving federal funds).
5. See Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1976) (repeating language of title VI to
ban age discrimination in programs receiving federal funds).
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federal funds that subject them to the command oftitle Vl, 6 the statute and its
analogues have become important modem adjuncts to the equal protection
principles of the Constitution.7
Yet, precisely what does title VI add to the equal protection guaranteed by
the Constitution? In covering private parties, the statute reaches beyond the
probable limit of the state action doctrine of the fourteenth amendment, 8 and
that is certainly an important contribution. But does the title VI prohibition of
"discrimination" also extend the substantive content of the constitutional
equal protection principle? That has been the focus of a long-running dispute.
The Supreme Court h.eld in Lau v. Nicho!s 9 that title VI, supplementea by
agency regulations, prohibits action having a discriminatory effect even though
the Constitution prohibits only intentional discrimination. 10 A majority of the
Court in Regents ofthe University of Ca!!forina v. Bakke, 11 however, cast doubt
on the holding of Lau by suggesting that the standards applicable under title
VI might be coterminous with those of the equal protection clause. 12 The federal courts of appeals have likewise followed divergent paths. 13
This dispute has obvious public policy implications. The Lau "effects test"
for discrimination would so effectively supplement constitutional claims by
plaintiffs, because of the pervasiveness of federal funding of state and local
government, that the Court's adoption of an intent test for unconstitutional
discrimination 14 would be substantially superseded, if not practically reversed.
If the effects test were to prevail, recipients of federal funds would necessarily
6. Compiling a complete list of federal aid programs to private entities and state and local governments is as elusive today as it was in 1963-64, when Congress debated and passed title VI. See note 51
infra (discussing inability of 88th Congress to establish with certainty number of programs or dollar
value of grants to be covered by title VI). A sense of the pervasiveness of such federal aid is apparent,
however, from the aggregate figures in the federal budget. The actual figures for 1980, the latest available for a completed fiscal year, show grants-in-aid totaling over $91 billion, or 15.8% of total budget
outlays. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL
ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1982 at 252 (Table H-7).
That figure, although it includes over $34 billion in grants to states and localities for payments to
individuals, excludes direct federal grants to private entities. I d. Every cabinet-level department except
Energy and Justice exceeded one billion dollars in such outlays in 1980, and Health and Human Services ($28.6 billion) and Transportation ($13 billion) each exceeded $10 billion in grants to state and
local governments. I d. at 250 (Table H-5). By region, the outlay in such grants ranged from $328 to
$502 per capita in 1980. I d. at 251 (Table H-6). Afthough such expenditures may now be decreasing in
their rate of growth, id. at 239, for the period from 1958 to 1978 such grants grew at an average annual
rate of 14.6%. Id.
7. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 2 (equal protection binding on state governments); id. amend. V
(due process binding on federal government). Although the fifth amendment does not contain an equal
protection clause, the Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth amendment equal protection requirements are implicit in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I,
93 (1976) (per curiam) (equal protection analysis under fifth amendment same as that under fourteenth
amendment); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (invalidating racial segregation in public
schools of District of Columbia as violative of due process guaranteed by fifth amendment).
8. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 983-84 (lOth ed. 1980) (discussing inability of foUr·
teenth amendment to reach discrimination not resulting from state action).
563 (1974).
9. 414
10. Id. at 567-69.
11. 438
265 (1978).
12. See id. at 287 (opinion of Powell, J.) (title VI proscribes only actions that would violate equal
protection clause or fifth amendment); id. at 325, 351-52 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall &
Blackmun, JJ.) (title VI meaning of discrimination absolutely coextensive with constitutional meaning).
13. See note 138 infra (citing contradictory title VI cases from Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits).
14. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977)
(showing of discriminatory purpose necessary to prove violation of equal protection clause; disproportionate impact alone insufficient).

u.s.
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become more attentive to the discriminatory effects of their actions, which in
tum probably would place renewed emphasis on affirmative action to end discriminatory results.
There are also substantial institutional considerations affecting the allocation of responsibility between the executive and judicial branches of government. If title VI standards are coterminous with those of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court ultimately will set the standards when it interprets the Constitution. Iftitle VI standards are independent of the Constitution, however, then
other federal decisionmakers may set the definitional standards. Under the
latter scheme, the Court's interpretation of the Constitution becomes a safety
net below which title VI may not fall, but above which it may soar. The Constitution-based scheme, on the other hand, would produce more mixed results,
for although it might relieve some of the current angst over intrusive federal
regulation, 15 it would not placate those who lodge similar complaints against
the federal judiciary.I6
This article seeks to resolve the dispute by re-examining the legislative
events of 1963 and 1964 that led to the passage oftitle VI. An examination of
the legislative history will demonstrate that Congress neither intended to
mimic the Constitution's equal protection clause nor to create a new rigid standard. Rather, it adopted, as part of a complicated compromise, a regulatory
model for title VI that invested federal departments and agencies with the
power to define the discrimination forbidden by title VI. This means that both
of the traditionally competing views of title VI are incorrect; 17 Congress
adopted neither an effects nor an intent test for discrimination, but instead
authorized agencies to make the choice through regulations.
To recognize that Congress adopted a regulatory model for title VI, however, solves only half the problem. The remaining question is how courts
should respond to agency interpretation of title VI. The flexible answers offered by administrative law principles fail to provide their usual enlightenment
because Congress placed in title VI ~~~~ stringent limits on agencies' interpretive powers. Moreover, one of these · "tations, the requirement that the President approve all agency regulations, has proved so cumbersome that it has
spawned an entirely new set of regulatory problems as agencies adopt unofficial "guidelines" which they consider binding even without presidential approval. This article seeks to articulate the considerations that should govern
judicial response to administrative interpretations of the title VI antidiscrimination mandate.
Finally, suggesting a judicial role for reviewing agency decisions under title
VI requires that this article examine more closely than courts have done in the
past what is meant by "effects" discrimination and "inten.tional" discrimina15. See SLOAN COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT AND HIGHER EDUCATION, REPORT: A PROGRAM
FOR RENEWED PARTNERSHIP l-2, 5, 9-11 {1980) {criticizing "clumsy, duplicative, insensitive, time-consuming, ineffective and expensive" regulatory procedures, particularly those relating to
antidiscrimination).
16. See L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE 17 (1976) (criticizing Court's regulation of schools
through desegregation decrees); cf. Burt, The Constitution ofthe Family, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 329, 387-88
(criticizing Court's "constitutional" regulation of family-state relations).
17. See generally Benjes, Heubert & O'Brien, Legalil)' of Minimum Competency Testing Programs
Under 1i~k YI ofthe Civr1 Rights Act of1964, 15 HARV. C.Il-C.L. L. REV. 537, 542-43 (1980) (discussing challenges to competency tests based on both "effects" and "intent" theories of discrimination
under title VI).
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tion. These phrases mask a wide range of subtler issues, issues so controversial
that one occasionally suspects that the phrases prove attractive to courts and
agencies because they obscure statutory lines of authority. If courts are to give
proper weight to agency regulations and guidelines, however, they must know
which definition of discrimination an agency has chosen, and that topic is
therefore a necessary part of the conclusion.
I.

AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF TITLE VI: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PRINCIPLES
A.

I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EARLY IMPACT

Conceptual Origins: The Constitution or Wider Principle?

When Congress in 1964 declared that recipients of federal funds may not
discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin, it did not so much
initiate one social and philosophical revolution as it enshrined two. Contrary
to popular assumptions, 18 the drive for racial equality in the United States had
not lain dormant during the first half of the twentieth century. 19 Rather, it had
proceeded along two parallel lines, one in the courts and the other in Congress,
leading ultimately to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On one front,
reformers in the legislative and executive branches argued that as a matter of
social policy the federal government ought to use all of its article I powers to
reach and eradicate private racial discrimination. 20 At the same time, reform18. An official government publication designed to promote understanding of discrimination in education, for example, begins its discussion of the issue with the 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and makes no mention of earlier civil rights efforts. NAT'L INST. OF
EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, A CiTIZEN'S GUIDE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
LAW 1 (1978). See also 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES Constitutional
Law: CiVIl Rights 315 (1968) (failing to discuss civil rights activities that occurred between 1896 and
1938, when separate-but-equal doctrine first questioned). One of the first widely disseminated documents revealing the long and continuous nature of the civil rights movement did not appear untill968.
REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 100-13 (1968) (discussing origins and
history of black protest movements from 1883 to 1967). Black civil rights groups won significant constitutional victories in the first half of the twentieth century, but they relied on principles other than the
equal protection clause to do so. See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259-61 (1937) (black agitator's
conviction violated first amendment rights when evidence failed to demonstrate incitement to violence);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (black defendant's conviction without effective counsel violated due process in capital case when defendant incapable of making own defense). Law was not the
only discipline to ignore black dissatisfaction. Historians and the predominant schools of thought
through the early 1950's downplayed slavery as an institution and looked benignly upon the experience
of blacks in America. Davis, Slavery and the Post- World War II Historians, DAEDALUS, Spring 1974, at
1; see Banton, 1960: A Turning Point in the Study of Race Relations, DAEDALUS, Spring 1974, at 31
(explaining that sociologists perceived race relations as field with low status and slow theoretical devel·
opment until 1960's); cf. K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION: 1865-1877, at 3-23 {1965) (discussing myths about Reconstruction).
19. See general(y R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JusTICE 1-314 (1976) (discussing history of civil rights enforcement before 1950); C. VosE, CAUCASIANS ONLY (1959) (providing specific study of role of NAACP in
litigation challenging racially restrictive covenants).
Legislative efforts produced only negative "suceesses." Civil rights advocates stopped some segregationist legislation early in the century, 6ut were unable to push thiough any of their own programs until
the late 1950's. See REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 101 {1968) (discussing NAACP court victories and absence of new civil rights legislation in early 1900's); Douglas,
Introduction to J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN at ix-xiii {1961) {Senator Paul H. Douglas
noting Senate's inability to pass legislation mandating desegregation in the 1950's).
20. See PRESIDENTS COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 107-12, 151-73
(1947) (recommending federal protection of civil rights through article I powers over voting, defense,
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minded groups urged the Supreme Court to overturn or restrict its nineteenthcentury decisions in Plessy v. Ferguson 21 and the Civil Rights Cases ,22 so that
discrimination could be eliminated in state government and some private organizations as a matter of constitutionallaw.23 These two different roots of title
VI are significant because they explain the essential ambivalence concerning
doctrine and implementation which have surrounded the statute since its
passage.
In 1947, seven years before the Court overruled the separate-but-equal doctrine,24 the President's Committee on Civil Rights25 issued its remarkable
agenda for civil rights enforcement, To Secure These Rights ,26 which called for
the programs and policies that Congress would later adopt in the civil rights
acts of the 1960's. 27 Although the report urged the overthrow of the separateinterstate commerce, taxing and spending, postal system, District of Columbia, and territories) [hereinafter To SECURE THESE RIGHTS]. Congress has legislative power originating outside article I as well.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,§ 2 (empowering Congress to abolish slavery by legislation); id. amend.
XIV,§ 5 (empowering Congress to enforce fourteenth amendment by legislation); id. amend. XV,§ 2
(empowering Congress to enforce voting rights by legislation); cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
100 (1945) (upholding constitutionality of criminal statute prohibiting willful violation of fourteenth
amendment). The Supreme Court, however, had viewed these powers as limited to enforcing the judicially defined terms of the Civil War amendments. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-22,32 (1883)
(fourteenth amendment does not authorize direct congressional regulation of private rights, but only
correction of prohibited state action); cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169, 173-74 (1970)
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) requires same degree of state action as required for fourteenth amendment
violation). Use of article I power to prohibit racial discrimination, therefore, would free Congress to
develop its own definition of civil rights.
21. 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of separate but equal accommodations).
22. 109 U.S. 3, 20-22, 32 (1883) (holding unconstitutional 1875 Civil Rights Act that prohibited discrimination not involving state action).
23. See generally R. KLUGER, SiMPLE JusTICE (1976) (describing litigation efforts of NAACP to ban
segregation).
24. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("Separate educational facilities are
inherently unequal").
25. President Truman created the Committee by executive action for the sole purpose of preparing a
report concerning "whether and in what respect current law-enforcement measures and the authority
and means possessed by Federal, State, an~ local governments may be strengthened and improved to
safeguard the civil rights of the people." Exec. Order No. 9808, 3 C.F.R. § 184 (Supp. 1946). The
Committee should not be confused with the later United States Commission on Civil Rights, created by
statute. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 101, 71 Stat. 634 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1975
(1976)). The Commission has existed since 1957, although it has described itself as a "temporary,
independent, bipartisan agency." U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A GENERATION DEPRIVED (frontispiece) (1977). It publishes regular reports on problems arising from discrimination and civil rights
enforcement. See id. (presenting Commission's findings and recommendations concerning school desegregation efforts in Los Angeles).
26. To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 20.
27. The Committee offered many suggestions, including recommendations for a federal fair employment practice act, id. at 167, and for a public accommodations act, id. at 170-71, which were adopted in
federal law in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976, Supp. II 1978 &
Supp. IV 1980) (employment discrimination); id. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1976) (public accommodations).
Other recommendations also met with later congressional approval. Compare To SECURE THESE
RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 160 (recommending abolition of poll taxes) with U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV
(abolition of poll taxes in federal elections); To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 160-61 (recommending protection of right to vote) with Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-4
(1976) (enforcement of voting rights); To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 161 (recommending
self government and suffrage for District of Columbia) with U.S. CoNST. amend XXIII (District of
Columbia suffrage). Other committee suggestions were acted upon by the courts. Compare To SECURE
THESE RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 166, 168 (recommending elimination of all segregation and enactment
of state legislation to end segregation in education) with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954) (segregation in public schools solely on basis of race violates equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment); To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 169 (recommending renewed court
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but-equal doctrine, 28 the Committee's legislative proposals assumed that both
Plessy and the Civil Rights Cases would remain in force, and recommended
that Congress bypass them with affirmative legislation under, inter alia, the
"taxing and spending powers."29 Presaging title VI, the Committee urged
"[t]he conditioning by Congress of all federal grants-in-aid and other forms of
federal assistance to public or private agencies for any purpose on the absence
of discrimination and segregation based on race, color, creed, or national
origin."30
The subsequent revolution at the Supreme Court, however, gave equal impetus to those who took the constitutional approach to placing restraints on
discriminatory use of federal funds. Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) 31
put an end to government practice of segregation-the most blatant form of
discrimination,32 but the Court went further after Brown, amending thenarrow view of state action it had adopted in the Civil Rights Cases and announcing that it was prepared to enforce desegregation directly against some private
parties.33 Beginning in 1961, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,34 the
Supreme Court issued notice that private parties having commercial or
financial dealings with state governments may be subject, under soQ.le circumstances, to the same standard of nondiscriminatory conduct that the fourteenth
amendment imposes on the government itself.35
The Burton case, which involved a commercial restaurant lease in part of a
state-owned garage facility, 36 led two years later to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,3 1 in which physicians
attack upon restrictive covenants and enactment of state legislation outlawing restrictive covenants)
with Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (judicial enforcement of covenants excluding persons of
designated race from ownership of real property is state action violating equal protection clause of
fourteenth amendment).
28. See To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 81-82 (criticizing Plessy because segregation
inherently creates inequality).
29. I d. at 109; see id. at 104-12 (enumerating eleven specific constitutional bases for federal action in
civil rights field).
30. Id. at 166 (emphasis added). The emphasized language is important. Because se~regation was
still constitutionally permissible at the time of the Committee's report in 1947, the incluston of "segregation" in this passage demonstrates that this conceptual progenitor of title VI incorporated an expectation that Congress would enact legislation to reach practices not prohibited by the Constitution.
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1].
32. I d. at 493; see Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (requiring implementation of
JJrown I "with all deliberate speed") [hereinafter JJrown II]. Although JJrown II did not articulate
precisely what steps states ultimately would have to take, the Court made clear as early as 1958 that it
would accept no state attempt to retain segregation. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1958)
(refusing to allow postponement of desegregation even though efforts had impeded education of all
students). See generally Hutchinson, Unanimity and .Desegregation: Oecisionmaking in /he Supreme
Court, 1948-19.58, 68 GEo. L.J. I, 73-86 (1979) (discussing Court's internal decisionmaking process in
Cooper).
33. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961).
34. Id.
35. See id. at 726 (discrimination by private party who leases state property and derives benefit from
adjoining state facility constitutes state action sufficient to violate fourteenth amendment). Later decisions confined the holding. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978) (state statute
allowing warehouseman's sale of goods on nonpayment of storage fee provides insufficient state involvement to constitute state action under fourteenth amendment); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974) (privately owned, state-regulated utility's termination of services for nonpayment not state action violative of fourteenth amendment).
36. 365 U.S. at 722-25.
37. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (en bane), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 938 (1964).
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claimed that two private hospitals had discriminated on the basis of race in
denying admittance to black physicians and patients.38 Judge Sobeloff, writing
for the court en bane, found that the hospitals' receipt of construction grants
under the federal Hill-Burton Act, 39 which "appropriat[ed] millions of dollars
of public monies pursuant to comprehensive governmental plans,"40 required
that the private hospitals operate their programs in accordance with the guarantees of equal protection.41 Moreover, the court stated that federal agencies
could not authorize grantees to take unconstitutional action but were constrained to ensure that grantees operated constitutionally.42
These two doctrinal sources for title VI, the use of article I powers and the
reliance on Constitution-based equal protection principles, surfaced repeatedly
throughout the 1964 debates, as sponsors argued that the title was both wise
social and moral policy as well as a restatement of the Burton and Simkins
constitutional holdings. In the House hearings on the 1964 Act,4 3 the Civil
Rights Commission took the lead in placing title VI on a high constitutional
plane, arguing that the statute would merely enforce existing executive authority to ensure that "federally assisted programs comply with the requirements of
the .fifth and fourteenth amendents to the Constitution."44 The Commission
viewed the law as primarily a procedural device for withholding federal funds
until a state "demonstrates its compliance with the Constitution and laws of
the United States."45 Civil rights organizations tended to support the Commis38. ld at 961.
39. Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 622(f), 60 Stat. 1041
(1946) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 29lc(e) (1976)). Congress substantially amended the Act in 1964.
See Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-443, §§ 2-625, 78 Stat. 447
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 29lo-l (1976)). It retained, however, the same underlying goal
of promoting hospital construction through state planning and monetary grants. Compare Hospital Construction Act: Hearings on S. 191 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 79th Cong., lst
Sess. 190 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Ellender) (primary purpose to furnish adequate health facilities for all
people) with 42 U.S. C. § 291 (1976) (same). See also Co=ent, Provision ofFree Medical Services by
Hill-Burton Hospitals, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 351,383 (1973) (discussing problem of medical services to poor). For a contemporary treatment of hospitals, providing background material useful in
evaluating their status as state "actors," see Clark, J)oes the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1416, 1426-28 (1980) (discussing governmental subsidies of health care industries,
which account for approximately 60% of health care expenditures).
40. 323 F.2d at 967.
41. ld
42. /d at 968.
43. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 101-1106, 78 Stat. 241 (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. IV 1980)). Following a presidential message
on civil rights legislation on February 28, 1963, the House of Representatives promptly began consideration of a set of bills that later yielded the 1964 Act. Civil Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., lst Sess. 907-08 (1963) (opening remarks of Chairman
Celler) [hereinafter House Subcomm. Hearings]. In that same year, the Senate considered a narrow bill
dealing only with public acco=odations. Civil Rights-Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732
Before the Senate r:omm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., lst Sess. 1 (1963) (opening remarks of Chairman
Magnuson) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. Final congressional action came after President Kennedy's
death on November 22, 1963, and was facilitated by a strong statement from President Johnson that he
supported the legislation and wished to see it enacted promptly. See H.R. Doc. No. 178, 88th Cong.,
lst Sess. 3, reprinted in 109 CONG. REc. 22,838, 22,839 (1963) (President Johnson addressing Joint
Session of Congress on Nov. 27, 1963) (urging "earliest possible passage" of civil rights bill).
44. House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1103 (prepared statement of Berl Bernhard, Staff
Director, U.S. Co='n on Civil Rights).
45. See id at 1093 (testimony of Commissioner Spottswood W. Robinson III) (explaining earlier
Commission reco=endations that President explore existing legal authority to withhold funds).
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sion's view,46 some even arguing that the title was unnecessary because the
Constitution already required what Congress proposed to do in title VI.47
Others, however, thought title VI to be compelled not by the Constitution but
by more general "national policy,"48 one Senator even equating the statute
with the coinage motto "E Pluribus Unum." 49 The confusion over whether
title VI rested primarily on constitutional or primarily on other philosophical
foundations was understandable, not only because the state of constitutional
interpretation was continually evolving,5° but also because the vast majority of
grantees covered by the title were governments already subject to the four~
teenth amendment. s1
46. A curious split among the civil rights groups is detectable: white-dominated organizations
tended to take the doctrinaire approach that title VI merely restated constitutional law, see note 47
infra, while black-dominated groups saw the provision as having substantial independent value. See
House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 2229 (testimony of James Farmer, National Director,
Congress of Racial Equality) (title VI involves great principle that federal government should not subsidize segregation); id. at 2160 (statement of Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary, NAACP) (Congress
should clarify antidiscrimination policy independent of court decisions). Although aware that a connection could be drawn between title VI and constitutional law, the black-dominated civil rights groups
tended to look upon discrimination as a systemic problem to be attacked by any practical means producing results and without regard for doctrinal niceties. See id. at 2161-65 (statement of Roy Wilkins)
(advocating mandatory termination of funds and shift of burden to school systems to show
nondiscrimination).
47. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 2406 (supplementary statement of Joseph
Rauh, Vice Chairman, Americans for Democratic Action) (title VI "is not only constitutional, but is
required by the Constitution"); cf. id. at 2122 (prepared statement of John Pemberton, Jr., Executive
Director, American Civil Liberties Union) (suggesting withdrawal of title VI because President already
had authority to withhold funds). At the time of these remarks title VI contained only a short declaration of principle with none of the restrictive language it now contains. Its necessity, therefore, may have
seemed less compelling at that stage of development. Compare note 148 i'!fra (quoting original text of
title VI) with notes 140-41 i'![ra (quoting final text of title VI). Nevertheless, Mr. Raub's statement
manifests his view that the origin of title VI, as then written, lay in the Constitution's equal protection
principles.
48. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th
Cong., lst Sess. 56 (1963), reprinted in [1964) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2425 (additional
views of Rep. Meader) (federal government can and should incorporate national policy against discrimination in financial aid grants) [hereinafter HousE JUDICIARY REPORT].
49. 110 CoNG. REC. 7061 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Pastore).
50. At the early stages of the House debates, for example, Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (en bane), cert. deniea, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), was still pending in
the Fourth Circuit. House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1541 (statement of HEW Secretary
Celebrezze); see notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text (discussing Simkins). In addition, the
Supreme Court had not yet handed down the first decision in which it defined the scope of its Brown II
implementation decree. See Goss v. Board ofEduc., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (decided June 3, 1963); note
64 i'!fra (discussing Goss).
51. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 80 app. A (Supp. 1966) (listing private and state-administered programs affected by title). Congress was never able to establish with certainty the number of programs or the
dollar value of grants that title VI would cover. See Letter from Deputy Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach to Chairman Emanuel Celler, reprinted in Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 71.52 Before 1/1e
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., lst Sess. 2773-79 (1963) (providing list of programs and
activities involving federal financial assistance affected by title VI, but acknowledging impossibility of
compiling complete list) [hereinafter House Comm. Hearings). Some opponents had argued that title
VI would apply to private individuals who received payments from the government. See HousE JUDI·
ClARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 69-70, reprinted in [1964) U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 2437-39
(minority report) (admonishing that title VI would destroy freedom of contract for subsidized farmers
and homeowners). Mr. Katzenbach's letter, however, stated that the Justice Department deemed such
grants or payments to fall outside the coverage of title VI. See Letter from Deputy Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach to Chairman Emanuel Celler, reprinted in House Comm. Hearings, supra, at 2773
(noting that direct payments to individuals do not constitute aid to a "program or activity," as required
by title VI). See also Co=ent, Tille VI ofthe Civil Rights Act of1964-Implementalion and Impact, 36
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824, 837-38 (1968) (amendments resolved uncertainty by placing insurance and

1981]

TITLE

VI

AND "DISCRIMINATION"

9

Early developments indicated that these constitutional and legislative forces,
although they drove toward the same social goal, were not altogether compatible; most of the evidence of this dichotomy surfaced not in philosophical statements but in the mechanics adopted by section 602 of title VI. 52 Congress
realized that the scope of title VI's antidiscrimination principle clearly would
not be self-evident in all contexts, and for that reason affected agencies-not
courts-were empowered to adopt "rules, regulations, or orders" to guide their
respective programs. 53 Significantly, Congress also directed that agencies draw
these regulations with an eye not merely toward attaining single-minded compliance with title VI's antidiscrimination principle but also toward maintaining
"achievement of the objectives" of the various underlying federal authorization statutes.54 Finally, by requiring presidential approval of all such regulations,55 Congress frankly admitted that it desired the final implementing rules
to bear strong political accountability, a goal theoretically at odds with the
view that the origins of title VI lay exclusively in constitutional command. 56
The differences in opinion regarding the philosophical origins of the statute
mattered little in 1963 and 1964. In the euphoric days following the death of
the "separate-but-equal" doctrine, but before the rise of two- and three-tier
constitutional analysis, 57 equal protection for most members of Congress had a
rather clearly discernible substantive content that paralleled the command of
section 601, the definitional section of title VI: do not discriminate on the basis
of race, color, or national origin. 58 This primarily connoted an end to.segregation,59 and storm clouds over the consensus appeared to most as no more than
a dispute over details. Section 602 authorized affected agencies and the President to clear up those details and proceed on a joint march with the federal
courts to end a century of mistreatment of black Americans. 60 As in the early
guaranty contracts beyond scope of title VI). Some viewed title VI favorably because of its broad
reach. See 110 CoNG. REc. 7061 (1964) (remarks of Sens. Pastore and Hart) (title VI would obviate
need to amend each grant statute individually).
52. See 42 U.S.C. g 2000d-l (1976) (providing enforcement procedures for title VI); note 141 i'!fra
(quoting final text of § 602).
53. 42
§ 2000d-l (1976).
54. Id.

u.s.c.

55. Id.
56. Cf. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 407, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1976) (authorizing Attorney General to
institute school desegregation suits, using phrase "equal protection of the laws" as in Constitution
rather than "discrimination" as in title VI).
57. See .Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-132 (1969) (distinguishing two tiers of review under equal protection clause: "active review" of cases involving suspect
classifications or fundamental interests and ''restrained review" of other cases); Regents of the Univ. of
Cal v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) ("middle tier" scrutiny used in sex discrimination cases also applies to affirmative action program).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); see note 140 i'!fra (quoting text of§ 601).
59. See Letter from Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to Chairman Emanuel Celler,
reprinted in House Comm. Hearings, supra note 51, at 2774 (stating one pu~se of title VI to override
existing federal law allowing assistance to segregated facilities); Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of19M-Implementation and Impact, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 824, 828-29 (1968) (title VI intended
to overrule existing federal statutes providing aid to segregated institutions).
60. Title VI, with its directive to the President and federal agencies concerning funding termination,
should be seen as only part of a wide-ranging attack contemplating that the executive department
would also directly involve the judiciary in the effort t~ alleviate discrimination against blacks. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (1976) (authorizing suits by Attorney General to enforce public accommodation provisions of title II); id. § 2000c-6 (1976) (authorizing suits by Attorney General against school boards
violating fourteenth amendment).
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stages of any revolution, 61 conceptual origins seemed less important than the
belief that all would work together to get the job done.
2. Early Reception by Appellate Courts: the Primacy of Judicial Law
In the five years following the passage of title VI, the executive and the judiciary worked together to implement the statute, as Congress had envisioned.
Despite hortatory language in some cases following Brown 1,62 the school desegregation effort that had begun in 1954 as constitutional litigation had by
1964 bogged down in a slough of implementation details. 63 The Supreme
Court had spoken clearly only once on the mechanics of desegregation, 64 and
its indecisiveness on that occasion reflected the Court's reluctance in the early
61. See generally Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 320-28 (1934) (discussing conceptual origins
and later disputes concerning sovereign immunity doctrine in postrevolutionary America); H. BERMAN,
JusTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 13-96 (rev. ed. 1963) (discussing conceptual origins of Soviet law; disputes and
changes following 1917 revolution); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity,
77 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-19 (1963) (discussing changing view of sovereign immunity doctrine before and
after American Revolution); Shirk, The 1963 Temporary Work Regulations for Full-Time Middle and
Primary Schools: Commentary and Translation, 55 CHINA Q. 511, 511 (1973) (discussing educational
policy disputes in postrevolutionary China).
62. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964) (ordering "quick and effective"
desegregation); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (ordering "earliest practicable completion" of
desegregation plan); Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (ordering desegregation "with all deliberate speed").
63. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. ofEduc., 372 F.2d 836, 855 (5th Cir. 1966) (discussing
court's difficulty in composing detailed administrative plans), qffd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cerl.
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 18·21 (1961) (describing Variety
of court decrees that apparently satisfy Brown II). See gen~rally HUMAN RIGHTS CASEFINDER 1953-69,
at 105-18, 133-34 (A. Gingered. 1972) (providing extensive collection of representative cases). For the
progress of a case illustrating the many obstacles that impeded successful desegregation, see Lee v.
Macon County Bd. ofEduc., 221 F. Supp. 297 (M.D. Ala. 1963) (order to submit detailed desegregation
plan); 9 RACE RELATIONS L. REP. 148 (M.D. Ala. 1964) (granting delay in instituting plan; granting
temporary restrainin~ order requiring transfer of black students); 231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964)
{per curiam) (prelimmary injunction prohibiting state from interfering with desegregation); 10 RACE
RELATIONS L. REP. 588 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (modification of plan); 10 RACE RELATIONS L. REP. 1512
(M.D. Ala. 1965) (transfer of some students; reconsideration of others); 253 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Ala.
1966) (per curiam) (order to institute freedom-of-choice plan); 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (per
curiam) (requiring interim statewide desegregation plan); 270 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (per
curiam) (prohibiting cutoff of federal funds independent of court action); 12 RACE RELATIONS L. REP.
1835 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (state teacher choice and tuition grant statutes unconstitutional); 12 RAcE RELA·
TIONS L. REP. 1840 {M.D. Ala. 1967) (teacher desegregation order); 12 RACE RELATIONS L. REP. 1844
(M.D. Ala. 1967) (order reopening schools closed by order of state court); 283 F. Supp. 194 (M.D. Ala.
1968) (per curiam) (order to desegregate athletic programs); 289 F. Supp. 975 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (per
curiam) (mem.) (conversion of temporary classrooms); 292 F. Supp. 363 (1968) (order to effect further
faculty desegration and to close some schools).
64. See Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 688 (1963) (transfer programs that promote segrega·
tion invalid). The case involved a so-called "minority to majority" transfer provision that permitted
students, following desegregative assignment by geographic zones, to transfer from a school in which
their race was the minority to one in which their race was the majority. /d. at 684. The admitted
purpose was to "permit a child [or his parents] to choose segregation.' /d. at 687 (quoting Superintendent of Schools). The Court invalidated the transfer plan because it tended to perpetuate segregation
and because race was the factor upon which the plans operated. I d. at 686, 688. The Court found it
unnecessary to consider any other aspects of the overall desegregation plan and reserved judgment on
whether unrestricted transfer provisions would prove acceptable. Id. at 688-89. That issue was not
addressed by the Court for another five years. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440-41
(1968) ("freedom-of-choice" plans unacceptable unless they offer "real promise" of aiding desegregation). Although the Court expressed some dissatisfaction with the pace of desegregation, it showed
little resolve to work out the problems itself. 373 U.S. at 689. It offered no guidance to the lower courts
for further applying Brown II except to characterize the transfer plans cryptically as not "reasonably
designed to meet legitimate local problems." Id.
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1960's to make broad pronouncements on racial issues. 65 Feder~l trial and appellate courts were left alone to treat the practical problems in greater detai1. 66
Seeking to aid the desegregation effort and armed with its authorization to
enforce title VI's antidiscrimination principle,67 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) adopted guidelines setting concrete targets for
school desegregation. 68 In considering how to respond to HEW's standards,
appellate courts were faced with a delicate question: were the standards synonymous with those of the Constitution, and if not, which standards should
prevail?
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the appellate court
most affected by school desegregation problems,69 responded with an ambivalence typical of judicial reaction to the HEW guidelines. Initially, the court
welcomed the agency's show of support. Judge Wisdom, writing for the panel
in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School .District,10 noted:
We attach great weight to the standards established by the Office of
Education [of HEW]. The judiciary has of course functions and duties distinct from those of the executive department, but in carrying
out a national policy the three departments of government are united
by a common objective. There should be a close correlation, therefore, between the judiciary's standards in enforcing the national policy requiring desegregation of public schools and the executive
department's standards in administering this policy.71
In addition to the moral support and encouragement that all southern fed65. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (holding equal protection
may apply to private lessee of state property, but discounting fears of "nigh universal application" of
fourteenth amendment); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959)
(holding literacy test not per se discriminatory, but condemning in dictum discriminatory implementation of tests). See also Bickel & Wellington, Le9islative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 7l HARV. L. REv. I, 4 (1957) (criticizmg Court's early reluctance to articulate reasoning on
racial issues as shown by per curiam reversals); Hutchinson, Sllpra note 32, at 60-73 (providing historical account of Court's use of per curiam reversals and refusals to hear cases apparently within its
jurisdiction).
66. See note 63 st~pra (illustrating complexity of problems facing lower courts).
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976) (granting agency power to enforce§ 601).
68. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, GENERAL STATEMENT OF
POLICIES UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964 RESPECTING DESEGREGATION OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 45 C.P.R.§ 181 (Supp. 1966) [hereinafter 1965 GUIDELINES);
OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, REVISED STATEMENT OF PoLICIES FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLANS UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, 45
C.P.R. § 181 (1967) [hereinafter REVISED GUIDELINES]; see Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School
.Desegre9ation in the South, 53 VA. L. REv. 42, 55-64 (1967) (discussing guidelines). Mr. Dunn, a legal
advisor m the Office of Education of HEW, described the implementation of the 1965 Guidelines as an
initial attempt to secure paper compliance. Dunn, st~pra, at 58-59. With the Revised Guidelines, the
emphasis shifted toward testing the effectiveness of the plans. Id
69. See Dunn, Sllpra note 68, at 73 (Fifth Circuit most prolific and progressive on subject of school
desegregation). See generally J. BASs, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981) (describing Fifth Circuit's efforts to
implement mandates of Brown II). At the time, the Fifth Circuit included the states of Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1976). Other circuits substantially
affected by the guidelines at this early date were the Fourth, Sixth (including Kentucky and Tennessee),
and the Eighth (including Arkansas). See Dunn, Sllpra, at 71-76 (discussing resolution of "free choice"
issue by various courts).
70. 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965) [hereinafter Singleton I].
71. Id at 731.
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era! judges must have needed during this period,72 more objective reasons led
the Fifth Circuit to welcome HEW's guidelines. First, the guidelines set out
not one but two tests for compliance: either satisfaction of the department's
detailed standards or compliance with a court's desegregation order.73 As the
Singleton court perceptively realized, this had the practical, if unintended, effect of inducing courts either to adopt HEW's standards or to mimic them.74
Otherwise, school districts could flaunt HEW's detailed standards and merely
meet the second test of the guidelines by complying with "substantially less
burdensome" judicial standards.75 In short, in order to ensure the integrity of
title VI standards76 and to avoid a deluge of recalcitrant school boards seeking
laxer rules in the federal courts,77 courts would have to match HEW's
guidelines.
Judge Brown, writing for the court in Price v. .Denison Independent Sclrool
.District ,18 pinpointed another concern that led the Fifth Circuit to accept the
HEW guidelines. The delayed-implementation decree of Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown II),1 9 said Judge Brown, had caused great anxiety for lower
court judges because it "inescapably puts the Federal Judge in the middle of
school administrative l?roblems for which he was not equipped . . . ."80 The
title VI guidelines eliniinated this problem by putting responsibility for administration "largely where it ought to be-in the hands of the Executive and its
agencies with the function of the Judiciary confined to those rare cases presenting justiciable, not operational, questions.'~8 1
The Fifth Circuit ini~ially implied, therefore, that executive and judicial
concepts of equal protection should be brought into harmony82 and that the
72. See J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 9-12, 236-38 (1961) (describin~ harassment of federal judges for pre-Brown rulings and political pressure suffered for desegregation actions); Jud$es:
Interpreters in the Front Line, TIME, May 12,1967, at 72-78 (describing bomb threats and local ostrac1sm
of District Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. because of his desegregation decisions).
73. 1965 GUIDELINES, supra note 68, §II, 45 C.P.R.§ 182.2 (Supp. 1966). HEW's earlier regulations
under title VI had recognized the same distinction. See 45 C.P.R.§ 80.4(c)(l) (court approval) (Supp.
1966); id § 80.4(c)(2) (agency approval). Whether adoption of such a bifurcated approach was necessary or proper has been the subject of keen debate. Compare Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 270 F.
Supp. 859, 865 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (three-judge court) (executive may not disapprove court-adopted plan
by terminating funds) with Comment, The Courts_, HEW, and Southern School .Desegregation, 11 YALE
LJ. 321, 324 (1967) (exception for court orders may be merely matter of administrative discretion).
74. 348 F.2d at 731.
75. Id
76. Judge Wisdom referred in Singleton I to the possibility that school boards might try to satisl)' low
judicial standards "as a means of circumventing" the explicit requirements contained elsewhere m the
HEW guidelines. Id
77. Id The Eighth Circuit's reasons for giving substantial deference to the HEW guidelines echoed
those expressed in Singleton I. See Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14, 18-19 (8th Cir. 1965) (practicalities
dictate that courts should model plans after executive standards). The other circuit most affected by
title VI, the Fourth, refused to follow the guidelines, noting that while they gave a "persuasive gloss" to
title VI, "the definition of constitutional standards ... is peculiarly a judicial function." Bowman v.
County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1967). The question of whether HEW's rules could act
as minimum standards arose ambiguously in Bowman, however, because, although HEW had approved
the board's plan, id at 328, the plan may have failed to meet the guidelines' test for desegregatiOn. See
id at 333 n.ll (Sobeloff, J., concurring specially) (comparing guidelines' recommended results with
actual, less successful, results).
78. 348 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1965).
79. 349 u.s. 294 (1955).
80. 348 at 1013.
81. Id at 1014.
82. See Singleton I, 348 F.2d at 731 (advocating close correlation between judicial and executive
standards of desegregation).
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judiciary should be willing to defer to HEW's special expertise when applying
constitutional principles in the educational setting. 83 This rosy picture of perfect cooperation was short-lived, however, for when the Singleton case came
again before the Fifth Circuit, 84 Judge Wisdom took a decide1y narrower view
of the guidelines, adopting them only as "minimum standards of general
application." 85
Exaggerated deference to HEW's guidelines failed in light of both of the
practical factors which had earlier induced the Fifth Circuit to honor the
guidelines. First, avoiding recalcitrant attempts to evade the standards
through litigation required only that the guideliries be treated as minimum desegregation standards, not standards coterminous with judicially declared
rules. If court decrees were at least as stiff as HEW's standards, school boards
would have no incentive to try to circumvent the guidelines by obtaining a
court decree. 86 Second, although southern judges sought the assistance of
agency expertise, in Singleton Judge Wisdom quickly realized that the line between "operational" administrative problems and "justiciable" judicial
problems87 was illusory. 88 A court has its own expertise when applying constitutionallaw to educational policy, because the court determines what the Constitution requires even if HEW experts find such relief to be educationally
unsound. 89 Similarly, the administrative help that title VI offered, especially
after revised standards were published in 1966,90 could be realized by adopting
83. See id. (HEW better qualified than courts to weigh administrative difficulties of desegregation
plans). The Fifth Circuit suggested that the HEW guidelines originated from judicial opinions and,
therefore, saw little problem with allowing courts to adopt and enforce them. See United States v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 851 (5th Cir. 1966) (guidelines represent standards previously established by Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit}, affd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.}, cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Dunn, supra note 68, at 58 n.85 (quoting Jefferson County). See also Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1967) (noting guidelines reflect earlier judicial
opinions).
84. Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1966) [hereinafter
Singleton II].
85. Id. at 869 (emphasis in original). Judge Wisdom attached great weight to the HEW standards,
but recognized that the courts should not abdicate their responsibility as interpreters of the Constitution. I d.
86. See note 73 supra and accompanying -text (explaining two methods for showing title VI
compliance).
~
87. See Price v. Denison Independent School Dist., 348 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1966) (judicial
function confined to deciding justiciable, not operational, questions).
88. Cf. Singleton II, 355 F.2d at 869 (it is for courts alone to determine when operation of school
system violates Constitution). For an incisive commentary on the actual expertise of HEW and its
capacity to apply that expertise, see Comment, The Courts, HEW, and Southern School .Desegregation,
77 YALE LJ. 321, 339-56 (1967).
89. See Singleton II, 355 F.2d at 869 (HEW standards may be too low to meet constitutional requirements); Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14, 19 (8th Cir. 1965) (courts may require, under constitutional law,
something more than, less than, or different from HEW guidelines). For example, in Singleton II, Judge
Wisdom noted that courts since Brown had ordered the immediate admission to formerly all-white
schools of the individual named plaintiffs in desegregation suits. 355 F.2d at 869-70. Certainly no
educational or administrative reasons would lead the court to overrule itself on that point. See United
States v. Jefferson County Bd. ofEduc., 372 F.2d 836, 849 (5th Cir. 1966) (court has duty to desegregate
while recognizing political, social, and moral aspects of problem}, affd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Singleton II, 355 F.2d at 869 (administrative problems cannot justify
denial of constitutional rights). Nevertheless, for most problems arising from class-wide relief, the
HEW guidelines provided invaluable assistance to the courts. 372 F.2d at 849.
90. See note 68 supra (citing REVISED GUIDELINES). The Revised Guidelines rendered ineffective
the "freedom-of-choice" plan as a desegregation device (previously supported by school boards because
it did not in fact lead to desegregation) and concentrated on more specific techniques and numerical
results. See Dunn, supra note 68, at 59-64 (explaining that Revised Guidelines added new requirements·
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the guidelines as a judicial minimum. The Fifth Circuit admitted in Um~ed
States v. Jefferson County Board ofEducation 91 that case-by-case appellate development of the law was a poor way to ensure reasonably prompt and uniform desegregation.92 The 1966 guidelines relieved the pressure by providing
minimum standards binding on district court judges,93 thereby leaving the appellate courts free to monitor only the remaining details. 94
The early judicial response to title VI, therefore, showed that federal courts
were willing to accord the statute an ancillary, but not co-equal, role in enforcing national antidiscrimination policy. When appellate courts found HEW's
standards to be minimally suitable they were willing to allow the Department
to share the burden of justifying relief decrees in the face of public hostility.
They reserved, however, the power to dictate that the Constitution required
higlier standards than those mandated by an agency. These courts maoe no
suggestion that HEW officials had misconstrued title VI or acted outside their
statutory authority by adopting standards less stringent than what courts interpreted the Constitution to require.95 Rather, the courts assumed that it was a
permissible interpretation of title VI to allow the antidiscrimination standards
of agencies to vary from those of the Constitution.96 The view of title VI as a
wise legislative policy rather than as a mere restatement of constitutional law
had apparently prevailed: in an area of article I competence, Congress and
executive agencies could require much of federal grantees, but courts, when
for voluntary desegregation in freedom-of-choice plans); if. Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d
326, 333 n.ll (1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring specially) (demonstrating that freedom-of-choice plans in
two Virginia counties ineffective).
91. 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), qffd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), eerl. denied, 389 U.S. 840
(1967).
92. Id at 854-55. By 1967 the Fifth Circuit had reviewed 41 school districts, many several times, and
had issued 76 orders in the process. Id at 860 & n.51. District courts had confronted 128 desegregation
cases and had issued 513 orders. Id Judge Wisdom complained of a ''wide lack of uniformity" and a
"time-lag" in district court enforcement of circuit standards. Id at 860.
93. Cf. id ("In certain cases-we consider unnecessary to cite-there has been a manifest variance
between this Court's decision and a later district decision"). Some of the illustrative cases that Judge
Wisdom chose not to cite are discussed in critical and embarrassing detail in J. PELTASON, FIFTY·
EIGHT LONELY MEN 7-8, 110 (1961).
94. Although the Fifth Circuit stressed in Jefferson County that the guidelines were to serve as minimum standards, it tacitly admitted that it reluctantly might permit exceptional plans to fall below them:
"In evaluating desegregation plans, district courts should make few exceptions to the Guidelines and
should carefully tailor those so as not to defeat the policies of HEW or the holding of this Court." 372
F.2d at 848.
95. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 886-88 (5th Cir. 1966) (HEW
guidelines requiring affirmative desegregation efforts consistent with title VI and valid as minimum
standards), qffd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), eert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); if. Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563, 571 (1974) (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J., concurring in result) (regulation
and guidelines statutorily correct and therefore control disposition of title VI case).
96. Because HEW chose to model its guidelines after court decisions and the courts chose to give the
guidelines great deference, the precise question whether title VI guidelines could vary from court-declared standards never specifically arose. In Jefferson County_, Judge Wisdom stated that the guidelines
"are required by the Constitution." 372 F.2d at 848. He followed that declaration, however, with an
expression of willingness to permit exceptions. See id (exceptions to guidelines should be few and
carefully restricted). Later in the opinion, Judge Wisdom rejected the school board's argument that
certain provisions of title VI did not permit busing or assignment of teachers with the p,ronouncement
that "we deal here with constitutional rights and not with those established by statute. ' Id at 883-84
(quoting Smith v. Board ofEduc., 365 F.2d 770, 784 (8th Cir. 1966)). In short, the court welcomed the
support of Congress and HEW in achieving desegregation, but when title VI and the guidelines departed from judicial views, the court was prepared to support its views by resort to the Constitution
Slone. See also Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14, 19 (8th Cir. 1965) (in reviewing desegregation plan
courts not bound by guidelines but only by Constitution).
·

1981]

TITLE

VI

AND "DISCRIMINATION"

15

the Constitution commanded it, could require more. 97
As the first round of school desegregation ended in the late 1960's,98 federal
courts had asserted the primacy of judicial law-the Constitution-over the
less protective legislative law-title VI. When desegregation moved outside
the South, to areas where detecting violations was of more immediate concern
than formulating remedies, a curious role reversal took place. HEW's title VI
regulations appeared to demand more of govemmentru grantees than did the
Constitution.99 It was unclear whether federal courts would continue to give
primacy to the Constitution, making judicial law both the ceiling and the floor
on federal rights, or whether they would view title VI as an orilinary statute,
incapable of diminishing constitutional principle but capable of extending
it.100
97. Laying aside the question whether the guidelines mimicked court decisions or the courts the
guidelines, it is ironic that the appellate courts systematically began to enforce Brown II only as a result
oflegislative and agency proddirig. The cross-pollination between court and agency is even more striking at the Supreme Court level. The Court, for example, declined to invalidate all freedom-of-choice
plans in 1963. See Goss v. Board ofEduc., 373 U.S. 683, 688-89 (1963) (invalidating freedom-of-choice
transfer plan based on race, but reserving judgment on validity of unrestricted transfer provisions); note
64 supra (discussing freedom-of-choice plans and Goss). This undoubtedly led HEW to permit freedom-of-choice plans in both its original and revised guidelines. In the other direction, the Revised
Guidelines reflected HEW's apparent disapproval of freedom-of-choice plans by requiring numerically
favorable results for those plans; this certainly influenced the Supreme Court in its later decision to
restrict the use of such plans. See Green v. County School Bd., 39fU.S. 420,432 n.2, 439 (1968) (citing
REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 68, without comment and subjecting freedom-of-choice plans to close
judicial supervision).
98. In 1968 the Supreme Court broke almost a decade and one-half of silence on implementation
issues by insisting upon complete enforcement of the Brown decree in the states that had practiced de
jure segregation. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (requiring desegregation
plan to produce immediate results). See also Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232, 235 (1970)
(per cunam) (same); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290, 292 (1970) (per curiam)
(same); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam) (same). The
Court heard its final case of this era in 1971, when it again confirmed the work of the lower courts
rather than laying down new rules. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 28
(1971) (canvassing and approving techniques for desegregation prescribed by district court). This period, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, marked the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of
the end. See generally TEXAS ADVISORY COMM., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT: SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION IN CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS 14-16, 76-81 (1977) (background discussion of segregation in Corpus Christi schools; findings and proposed desegregation plans).
99. This was due primarily to the "effects" analysis that the regulations and guidelines adopted.
Because segregated housing patterns prevailed in the North and West, the use of neighborhood school
zones necessarily had the ejfect of establishing highly segregated school systems, or de facto segregation. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 217-19, 236 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (de facto segregation due to housing patterns must be corrected). See generally U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STAFF REPORT: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN KALAMAZOO, MICHIGAN 1-2
(1977) (discussing segregation in Kalamazoo schools); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STAFF REPORT:
ScHOOL DESEGREGATION IN COLORADO SPRINGS, COLO. 1 (1977) (discussing segregation in Colorado
Springs schools). Supreme Court cases dealing with such discrimination in constitutional tenns have
been marked by use of evidentiary techniques to stretch previously accepted constitutional principles,
see Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. at 207-211 (burden-shifting); loss of unanimity and an increase in closely split decisions, id at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Columbus Bd. ofEduc. v. Penick,
443 U.S. 449, 469 (1979) (Stewart, J.) (explaining split opinions); reversals of lower court findings of
discrimination, see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (.Dayton I); limitations on
remedies, see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427
U.S. 424 (1976); and finally, analytical conversions of the cases into one fitting the traditional southern
model of de jure segregation). See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (.Dayton II);
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. at 525 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Powell, J., dissenting). By
1979 the constitutional aspects of school desegregation outside the South had severely fractured the
Court. See Columbus Bd. ofEduc. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 468-69 (1979) (Burger, C.J.) (noting diversity of opinions among members of Court).
100. q: Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (title II of 1964 Civil
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THE STATUTE'S ROLE RE-EXAMINED: THE PRIMACY OF LEGISLATIVE LAW

1. The Lau Decision

Lau v. Nicho!s, 101 decided in 1974 after the first wave of southern school
desegregation, 1°2 was the first Supreme Court case to arise under title VI. In
Lau, the Court suggested that title VI might play a substantial role in supplementing the antidiscrimination command of the fourteenth amendment. 103
The case involved a suit by non-English-speaking students of Chinese ancestry
who claimed that San Francisco school officials had failed to provide adequate
and equal instruction for them, violating their rights under both the equal protection clause and title VI. 104 Lower courts had denied relief on the theory that
the educators had not intentionally discriminated against this group of students and had provided the same educational opportunity to all students
within the system. 105 The Ninth Circuit stated that any resulting inequality
derived not from discrimination, but from the "different advantapes and disadvantages" that each "student brings to the starting line of his educational
career." 106
Justice Douglas' opinion for a unanimous Court rejected this theory, holding that in the context of California's requirements of compulsory education
and English proficiency for graduation, 107 there was "no equality of treatment" because the non-English-speaking students were "effectively foreclosed
from any meaningful education." 108 The Court declined, however, to base its
conclusion on the Constitution, 109 instead relying upon the "effects test" for
discrimination adopted by HEW's title VI regulations. 110 The Court noted that
HEW guidelines specifically addressed the language problem for national-oriRights Act prohibits private discriminatory acts affecting commerce even though Constitution alone
does not).
101. 414 u.s. 563 (1974).
102. See note 98 supra (discussing cases in "first wave").
103. Id at 566.
104. Id- at 564-65.
105. See Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 796 (9th Cir. 1973). The school system previously had undergone a general desegregation plan as a result of federal litigation. See Lee v. Johnson, 404 U.S. 1215,
1218 (1971) (denying stay of district court decree ordering reassignment of Chinese students within San
Francisco public schools); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315, 1324-25
(N.D. Cal. 1971) (ordering district to provide racial and ethnic balance among students by busing).
106. 483 F.2d at 797.
107. 414 U.S. at 565-66. The requirements are codified in California law. See CAL. Eouc. CoDE
§§ 71, 8573 (West Supp. 1973) (current version at§§ 30, 51225 (West 1978)) (requiring English proficiency in public schools); id § 12101 (West Supp. 1973) (current version at§ 48200 (West 1978)) (requiring attendance at school).
108. 414 U.S. at 566.
109. The Court had faced a similar issue in 1966, when it was called upon to decide the constitutionality of a New York law requiring English literacy as a prerequisite to voting. See Cardona v. Power,
384 U.S. 672, 673 (1966). Instead of reaching the constitutional question, the Court remanded the case,
id at 674, for reconsideration in ligllt of a statutory decision it had rendered the same day. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, M7 (1966) (New York literacy requirement unenforceable to extent
inconsistent with federal Voting Rights Act). Justice Douglas, the author of Lau, dissented from the
Court's action in Cardona on the ground that the Court should have reached the constitutional issue.
384 U.S. at 675-77 (Douglas, J., with Fortas, J., dissenting).
110. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. at 566. The Court, quoting from HEW regulations, stated:
Discrimination is barred which has that tjfect even though no purposeful design is present: a
recipient "may not . . . utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of
subJecting individuals to discrimination" or have "the effect of defeating or substantially im-
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gin minority students 111 and directed that affected schools "must take affirmative steps" to open their programs to such persons. 112
In retrospect the Court's decision to defer to federal administrators in Lau
appears to have been the high-water mark for federal judicial willingness to
halt state conduct which did not rather obviously stem from intentional stateiniated discrimination. 113 Indeed, the difficult issue of whether the equal protection clause forbids only intentional discrimination, a question avoided in
Lau, came to the Court twice in the three terms following that decision and the
Court resoundingly decided it in the affirmative both times. 114 In adopting an
effects test for title VI in Lau, therefore, the Court must have been aware that it
was recognizing a distinction between the statute and constitutional principles.
The Court also must have known that this departure from the intent standard
would yield a title VI that expanded upon and supplemented the antidiscrimination theme of the equal protection clause. IIS
Moreover, the Lau Court implicitly rejected a possible reading of the early
appellate decisions under title VI, that the supplementary role of the statute
extended only to defining remedies for fourteenth amendment violations. 11 6
Lau quite clearly considered title VI to be more than simply a remedy for
equal protection violations. The Court relied on the statute, and its underlying
regulations, to define a violation as any action that has the "effect" of denying
educational opportunities to national-origin minorities. 117 Indeed, the Court
declined to rule on whether the defendants had violated the fourteenth amendment, but instead found that they had violated the substantive prohibitions of
title VI. I Is The ancillary role that the Court saw for title VI in 1974, therefore,
was to provide supplemental substance to the fourteenth amendment, not
merely to provide supplemental enforcement procedures for it.
pairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular
race, color, or national origin."

Id at 568 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1970)) (emphasis in original).
Ill. 414 U.S. at 568.
112. Id (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970)).
I 13. C.f. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) (no persuasive reasons to overturn state
supreme court judgment invalidating state constitutional amendment on federal constitutional
grounds). See also C. ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS 92 (1980) (Reitman high-water mark in Warren
Court's ·willingness to find state action).
I 14. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-71 (1977)
(equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment incorporates intent standard); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976) (equal protection component of fifth amendment incorporates intent
standard).
I 15. The Lau Court's awareness that constitutional claims would require proof of intent but could be
supplemented by statutes adopting an effects test is illustrated by two earlier decisions. Compare Keyes
v. School Dist. No. I, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 201-03 (1973) (Brennan, J.) (constitutional claim of
school segregation requires proof that school authorities pursued intentionally segregative policy) with
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971) (title VII claim of employment discrimination
may succeed with proof of discriminatory effect).
116. Because the Fifth Circuit decisions involved cases in which the courts had made prior findings
of discrimination, unaided by the then-unformulated title VI guidelines, it is possible that the guidelines provided not a definition of wrongs constituting "discrimination," but only a remedy for those
wrongs. C.f. R. BORK, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUSING PROPOSALS (1972) (busing proposals adopted by Congress not unconstitutional because provide remedy for, and not definition
or; wrong).
I 17. 414 U.S. at 566.
118. Id
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2. Bakke and Its Limits
Four years later, in Regents of the University of Calffornia v. Bakke, 119 the
Court reopened the question of the role of title VI and cast doubt on its holding in Lau. Bakke, a white applicant for admission to a state medical school,
charged that he was denied admission because of his race. 120 He based his
claim on the school's affirmative action program, which partially segregated
the admissions process and applied different admissions criteria to applicants
on the basis of race. 121 He argued that this procedure violated both his constitutional right to equal protection and his statutory right under title VI not to be
subjected to discrimination in the university's federally-supported programs. 122 Although the California Supreme Court decided the case on equal
protection grounds, 123 the United States Supreme Court, following its usual
practice of disposing of a case whenever possible through statutory rather than
constitutional interpretation, 124 ordered argument on the title VI claim. 12S
A majority of the justices, however, found it impossible to avoid the constitutional issue. 126 Their investigation convinced them that Congress had, in the
words of Justice Powell, intended "incorporation of a constitutional standard
into Title VI," 127 and that, in in the words of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun (the Brennan coalition), "as applied to the case before us,
Title VI goes no further in prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment itself." 128 Consequently, five members of the Court found that the statutory issue merged with the constitutional
issue, requiring an interpretation of the equal protection clause.129
119. 438 u.s. 265 (1978).
120. Id at 272-77 (opinion of Powell, J., joined as to this statement of facts by a majority of the
Court).
121. Id See generally A. SINDLER, BAKKE, DEFUNIS, AND MINORITY ADMISSIONS 49·86 (1978) (pro•
viding detailed discussion of facts of Bakke).
122. 438 U.S. at 277-78. Before initiating his court case Bakke had filed a title VI complaint against
the university with the San Francisco regional office of HEW. See A. SJNDLER, supra note 121, at 78-79
(discussing procedural background of case).
123. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 63,553 P.2d 1152, 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680,
700 (1976), qff'd in part, rev'd in part, 4~8 U.S. 265 (1978).
124. 438 U.S. at 281 (opinion of Powell, J.) (Court will not pass on constitutional question if other
basis for disposition exists) (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring}).
125. 434 U.S. 900 (1977) (order to file supplemental brief).
126. See 438 U.S. at 281, 284-87 (opinion of Powell, J.); id at 328-40 (opinion of Brennan, White,
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). The remamingjustices deemed it unnecessary to decide the constitutional
issue because, in their view, title VI on its face required that no person be "excluded from" any covered
program. Id at 412 (opinion of Stevens, J., witli Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964)). The medical school was a covered program, and the "plain language of the
statute therefore require[d) affirmance" of the California court's judgment for Bakke. Id
127. Id at 286. Elsewhere, Justice Powell referred to the title VI prohibition on discrimination as
"similar to that of the Constitution." Id at 284 (emphasis added). He offered no explanation for the
difference in statements, and the language quoted in the text displays what appears to be the major
thrust of the opinion. See id at 285 (noting that many supporters believed title VI "enacted constitutional principles").
128. 438 U.S. at 325. Like Justice Powell's opinion, the opinion of the Brennan coalition uses
phrases of varying intensity to indicate how closely title VI relates to the Constitution, but the quoted
statement appears to express the major thrust of the opinion.
129. Although reaching the same conclusions in Bakke, Justice Powell and the Brennan coalition
developed opinions with substantially different flavors. The Brennan group focused on refuting the
dissent's view that title VI forbade affirmative action that excluded whites; thus, they directed their
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Looking back on the Bakke decision inBoard ofEducation v. Harris, 130 Justice Stewart, in dissent, read the earlier case as one in which "[f]ive Members
of the Court concluded that Title VI . . . prohibits only discrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth."131 Because only intentional discrimination violates equal protection
principles, he continued, title VI must also demand discriminatory intent. 132
Such an argument, of course, would mean the implicit overruling of Lau v.
Nichols and would limit the ancillary role of title VI to a primarily procedural
one-imposing constitutional standards on all federal grantees and providing
a means for enforcement by terminating funds. Moreover, Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun frankly admitted in Bakke that they entertained "serious doubts concerning the correctness of what appears to be the
premise of [the Lau] decision."I33
Despite their doubts, the former Brennan coalition, together with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens, 134 refused in Harris to overrule Lau . 13s The
reluctance to determine the precise contours of title VI was consistent with the
coalition's analysis in Bakke. There they explicitly stated that title VI should
be read to be coextensive with the equal protection clause, but predicated their
decision upon the administrative regulations under title VI as well as constitutional premises.t36
Because both Congressional and administrative interpretations of title VI
attention toward showing that the words of title VI could not be taken literally. That led them in tum
to focus not only on the Constitution as a guide to intei]>retation, but also on HEW's permissive regulations, to which they devoted considerable attention. See id at 341-45 (opinion of Brennan, White,
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) (regulations entitled to "considerable deference in construing Title VI").
This emphasis on the regulations, absent from Justice Powell's opinion, may be significant because it is
primarily the regulations that vary from constitutional standards, particularly in their adoption of the
"effects" test used in Lau. See note 110 supra (quoting Court's opinion in Lau).
130. 444 u.s. 130 (1979).
131. Id at 160 (Stewart, J., with Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
132. Id
133. 438 U.S. at 352.
134. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens adhered to the position they had taken in Bakke, 438
U.S. at 418-19, which was to read the statute at issue independently of the fourteenth amendment. 444
U.S. at 149. Justice Powell, dissenting in Harris, also maintained consistency with his position in
Bakke by reading the statute in conjunction with the fourteenth amendment and requiring proof of
intentional discrimination. 444 U.S. at 160. The position of the majority in Harris, however, appears
to be contrary to the position those justices took in Bakke. Compare Harris, 444 U.S. at 149 Qeaving
open question whether title VI limited by fourteenth amendment) with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 352 (oi>inion
of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackniun, JJ.) (title VI no broader than Constitution). In adaition,
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, dissenting in Harris, appeared to take a view different from their position in Bakke. Compare Harris, 444 U.S. at 160 (Stewart, J., with Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting)
(title VI incorporates constitutional standard) with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 417-18 (opinion of Stevens, J.,
with Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.) (title VI can proscribe conduct Constitution does not).
135. 444 U.S. at 149. The precise issue in Harris was whether Congress had adopted an intent or an
effects test in determining eligibility for federal funding under the Emerg~ncy School Aid Act (ESAA),
20 U.S.C. §1! 1601-1619 (1976) (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3191-3207 (Supp. III 1979)). ESAA is
an outgrowth of earlier efforts, dating from the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by which Congress sought to
aid special efforts to promote integration. See id § 3192(b) (purpose to assist in desegregation of
schools). In Harris the school board contended that the ineligibility test of the statute should be read in
parallel with title VI, which it contended now possessed an intent requirement. 444 U.S. at 139. The
Court held that because ESAA could be interpreted on its own terms, there was no need to decide the
issue of its congruence with title VI or the scope of title VI. Id at 149. The Court, however, labored
painfully to establish that the two statutes could adopt different tests. See id at 146 n.lO, 150 n.l3
(legislative histories of ESAA and title VI indicate two acts need not be entirely interdependent).
136. 438 U.S. at 341-45. The coalition pointedly noted that "Congress specifically eschewed any
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favored the Brennan coalition's result, its statement that "Title VI's definition
of racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the Constitution's" !37
was unnecessary for decision of the case; the pertinent inquiry is not whether
Congress intended to adopt equal protection principles as the source for title
VI's standards, but whether it adopted constitutional standards as the exclusive
determinant of title VI prohibitions, eliminating the relevance of administrative interpretation. That issue was unnecessary for decision in Bakke, painfully avoided in Harris, and most critical to the proper interpretation of title
VJ.I38
II. TITLE VI AND THE ART OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Principles and Institutions

Although the Bakke Court was deeply divided, all of the justices implicitly
agreed upon one issue: title VI could not be treated as a constitutionally compelled statute, as a mere legislative restatement of what the Constitution already required. 139 But what role was title VI to play? The legislative history
static definition of discrimination in favor of broad language that could be shaped by experience, admin·
istrative necessity, and evolving judicial doctrine." I d. at 337 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 352.
138. The United States Court of Appeals for the the Second Circuit, the court most troubled by the
issue, has split on how to read the Supreme Court's interpretations of title VI. The first case to present
the issue to the Second Circuit was the one that later became the Supreme Court decision of Harris.
Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1978), affd on other grounds sub. nom. Board of Educ.
v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979). The court, including two visiting judges, upheld the use of an effects test
in an employment case arising under title VI, relying in part on an analogy to title VII's effects test and
in part on Lau. I d. at 587-88. In the first case following the Supreme Court's decision in Harris, however, the Second Circuit panel adopted an intent test for title VI in the context of school desegregation,
drawing an analogy to title IV of the 1964 Act and holding that it employed an intent test. See Parents
Ass'n v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 715-16 (2d Cir. 1979). A year later the circuit faced a claim that
emotionally disturbed students were suffering racial discrimination and once again held that title VI
required proof of intent, citing to Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Harris. See Lora v. Board of
Educ., 623 F.2d 248, 250 (2d Cir. 1980) (title VI standard same as constitutional standard). Judge
Oakes wrote separately to emphasize his view that Lau was still good law. Id. at 251-52 (Oakes, J.,
concurring). Disposition of the case again depended upon the vote of a district judge sitting by designation. I d. at 249. Five weeks following Lara, a panel majority consisting of Judge Newman and Chief
Judge Feinberg refused to apply either Lara or Ambach to a suit alleging racial discrimination in the
closmg of a hospital. Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612,616-17 (2d Cir. 1980) (appeal from denial of preliminary injunction). The court held that even if the effects test were applicable, the defendant had justified the disparate impact of its actions sufficiently to defeat the plaintiffs' claim. I d. Judge Kearse, in
dissent, argued that the regulations adopted pursuant to title VI required the "effects" test to be the
guiding standard in such cases. Id. at 621-23 (Kearse, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Third Circuit recently faced the same problem seen in Bryan, and ruled that title VI requires no
proof of intent. NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 2032, 2033 (3d Cir. June 29, 1981) (en
bane). The effects test, however, did not require a finding of violation because the defendant demonstrated business necessity for its actions. Id.
A panel of the Fifth Circuit has concluded that Bakke requires proof of intent in title VI cases,
although it admitted confusion over the current status of Lau. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989,
1007 (5th Cir. 1981) (school's ability-grouping system based on racial and ethnic criteria not violative of
title VI because statute does not prohibit benignly motivated discrimination).
139. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (title
VI legislatively adopts by reference the constitution's equal protection standard); id. at 336 (opinion of
Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) (title VI not constitutionally compelled); id. at 416 (opinion of Stevens, J., with Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.) (title VI has independent force in aCidition to that of Constitution).
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allows us to conclude further that Congress also did not intend in section
601 140 to adopt constitutional principle which section 602 141 would then
merely procedurally enforce; rather Congress adopted philosophical constitutional principle knowing that it would be tempered by other non-constitutional
considerations. More tellingly, Congress saw title VI not as one more vehicle
for enforcement ofjudiciallaw and principle, but as a new, though somewhat
parallel, source of legislative law and principle.
The wording of title VI, its legislative history, and its relation to other provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 show that Congress intended to enshrine a
policy of nondiscrimination in the use of federal program funds that was to be
responsive to agency expertise and to congressional political desires. It was to
reflect, and to draw upon, judicial law under the Constitution but would be
within what Congress viewed as the swift and flexible control of federal agencies, not lumbering judicial processes.
2. The Focus of Inquiry: H.R. 7152
The Bakke Court's inquiry into the interpretation of title VI properly began
with the notation that the word "discrimination," which appears in the prohibitory language of section 601 of title VI, has no fixed meaning. 142 Definitions
of discrimination may run the gamut from demanding intentional causation to
140. Section 601 of title VI provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground ofrace,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1976).
141. Section 602 of title VI provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of
insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d
[§ 601] of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or
orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of
the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the
President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected
(I) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or
activtty to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after
opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termiriation or
refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to
whom such a finding has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part therof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other
means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the
department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure
to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by
voluntary means. In the case of any action, terminating, or refusing to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file
with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program
or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action.
No such action shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such
report.

u.s.c 2000d-l (1976).
142. See 438 U.S. at 284 (opinion of Powell, J.) (concept of "discrimination" susceptible of varying
interpretations); id at 337-38 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) (Congresseschewed static definition of "discrimination"). Justice Stevens, in dissent, attempted to impart specific
meaning to the word "discrimination," but he relied principally on the more easily defined word "excluded." See id at 413-14 (opinion of Stevens, J., with Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.) (clear
language of statute precludes qualification of word "exclusion"). Justice Stevens was incorrect; Con42
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requiring only discriminatory impact or effect. Turning to the legislative record to determine which meaning Congress intended, and employing as their
favored technique the quotation of congressional debaters, the judicial historians in Bakke relied on numerous excerpts to prove their points. 143 This
method of historical inquiry has dubious value in the easiest of cases 144 and
decisively fails to give an accurate picture of the making oflegislation in such a
charged atmosphere as that surrounding adoption of title VI. Members of the
legislative branch, no less than those of the judicial, recognize that constitutional rhetoric strengthens a difficult argument, and it is not surprising, therefore, that those who rely on quotations can find many in the title VI debates
that allude to constitutional principles. Sifting of quotations, however, simplistically treats the legislative history of title VI and obscures the complex
"dance oflegislation" 145 that produced that provision. The Congress that considered title VI was aware of the ambiguity inherent in the word "discrimination," and indeed this central definitional problem set the agenda for
legislative action. Congress, however, resolved the problem not with a flurry
of rhetoric, but with a carefully constructed compromise.
The bill that Congress ultimately enacted began as H.R. 7152, 146 an omnibus bill designed to alleviate racial discrimination in voting, public accommodations, public education, federally assisted programs, and employment.1 47
The provision regarding federally funded programs, then as now labeled title
VI, 148 had two purposes. First, in a single sentence it gave the executive
branch the power to withhold funds when program beneficiaries had been
"discriminated against on the ground of race," 149 a power applicable to all
gress itself saw great ambiguity in the word "discrimination." See notes 170-91 infta and accompanying
text (relying on legislative history to show congressional uncertainty regarding definition).
143. See 438 U.S. at 284-87 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting from statements of members of Congress); id. at 328-40 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) (same); id. at 413-16 (opin·
ion of Stevens, J., with Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.) (same).
144. See Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 119, 155 (1965) (criticizing Supreme Court's reliance on "dubious" legal history).
145. E. REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 10 (1973) (quoting WoODROW WILSON, CONORES·
SIONAL GOVERNMENT 297 (1913)).
146. See House Suhcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 649-60 (quoting text of H.R. 7152).
147. Jd. at 2349 (statement of Rep. Celler) (acknowledging H.R 7152 as basis for subcommittee's
efforts). Actually, 168 bills and four joint resolutions, many fairly repetitious, had been introduced in
the House and were before the subcommittee. I d. at iii-iv (table of contents). Meanwhile, the Senate's
efforts on a civil rights bill focused on a public accommodations law, and hearings on the Senate side
were restricted to that topic. See generally Senate Hearings, supra note 43 (record of hearings).
148. See House Suhcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 659 (text of title VI ofH.R. 7152). The origi·
nal text provided:
Sec. 601. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any law of the United States
providing or authorizing direct or indirect financial assistance for or in connection with any
program or activity by way of grant, contract, loan, insurance, guaranty, or otherwise, no such
law shall be interpreted as requiring that such financial assistance shall be furnished in cir·
cumstances under which individuals participating in or benefiting from the program or activity are discriminated against on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin or are
denied participation or benefits therein on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin. All contracts made in connection with any such program or activity shall contain such
conditions as the President may prescribe for the purpose of assuring that there shall be no
discrimination in employment by any contractor or subcontractor on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin.
I d.
149. Jd.

I
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federal programs and contracts. 150 Second, the drafters of title VI intended it
to provide the source of Congress' power under article I of the Constitution to
reach private discrimination in employment, 151 and in a second sentence,
therefore, they gave the President power to prescribe federal contract provisions that would outlaw employment discrimination by federal contractors, a
goal to be pursued by a presidentially appointed Commission on Equal Em- .
ployment Opportunity established under title VIJ.I52
The procedural confusion that surrounded progress of the bill makes ii difficult to find a specific statement of reasons why Congress altered this first version of title VI and what it hoped the changes would accomplish. Only one set
of fact-finding hearings on the bill took place, 153 and the House committee
adopted a substantially revised substitute after a brief but revealing executive
sessiOn with the Attorney General 154 and after the powerful committee chairman had stifled debate.ISS The Senate held no hearings and indeed did not
consider the bill at all in committee, but only in an informal caucus among the
bipartisan leadership. 156 The Senate made few changes in title VI, I 57 however,
and the House hearing record and Judiciary Coinmittee report, therefore, comprise the most authoritative source's reflecting the concerns that led to the final
version of title VI.

150. Id Previous executive orders forbidding racial discrimination by federal contractors had operated upon the same spending power rationale. See Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 C.F.R. 11,527, reprinted
in [1962] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 4386, 4386-89 (Kennedy order prohibiting discrimination in
housing industry). There was concern, however, that the President alone lacked constitutional authority
to attach congressionally unapproved conditions to federal contracts, cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (presidential power to act without congressional authorization limited),
and title VI, together with the proposed title VII, was designed to supplement with specific statutory
authority the President's argument of inherent authority to set terms of contracts. See HotiSe Subcomm.
Hearings. supra note 43, at 1023-24 (oral testimony of Robert Sauer, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Housing
and Home Finance Agency).
151. See HotiSe Suhcomm. Hearings. supra note 43, at 1489-92 (statement of Secretary of Labor
Wirtz) (discussing problem of minority unemployment and hope that titles VI and VII would eliminate
discrimination causing it).
152. See note 148 supra (text of title VI of H.R. 7152). Such a limited equal employment enforcement program had operated without explicit legislative sanction for two decades prior to 1964. See
Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. § 957 (1938-1943 Compilation) (1941 Presidential order under war
powers prohibiting discrimination in defense production industry).
153. See HotiSe Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43 (comprising 2649 pages of transcribed material,
including presentations from 101 witnesses and correspondents); HousE JuDICIARY REPORT, supra
note 48, at 44, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 2413 (additional views of Rep.
Meader) (summarizing subcommittee action).
154. See HotiSe Comm. Hearings, supra note 51, at 2651, 2653-60 (testimony of Attorney General
Kennedy) (seeking revisions in other titles of bill but demonstrating satisfaction with subcOmmittee's
version of title VI).
, 155. See note 178 in.fra and accompanying text (discussing Chairman Celler's attempts to close
discussion).
156. The Senate leaders persuaded their colleagues to make substantial changes in other portions of
the act, but not in title VI. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS MANUAL, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, at 289, 298 (1964) (explaining Senator Humphrey's position that Senate made no
substantive changes in title VI). The Senate held hearings only on public accommodations. See Senate
Hearings, supra note 43,passim (record of hearings).
157. See notes 219-21 in.fra and accompanying text (explaining minor Senate changes).
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THE DRAFTING OF TITLE VI-THE NEED TO COMPROMISE

Criticism of H.R. 7152 at the House Hearings

Criticism of title VI of H.R. 7152 focused on four perceived problems: (1)
discretionary enforcement power placed in the executive; (2) the scope of sanctions in relation to the extent of discrimination; (3) the denial of judicial review; and (4) the vagueness of the term "discrimination." In order to construe
properly the present version of title VI, it is necessary to understand these criticisms, with the last being especially important.

.Discretionary E'!forcement.

The passive language of the original first
sentence of title ·VJ1 58 was designed by the administration to allow it some
flexibility in enforcement of the provision. President Kennedy had argued in
his second public address on the bill that inflexible funding termination decisions could close programs needed by blacks as well as whites. 159 Neither conservatives nor liberals in the House found that argument very persuasive.
Liberals, led by Representative (now Senator) Charles Mathias, Jr., voiced
concern that such discretion would allow presidents to make title VI a dead
letter, pointing out that the President had waived similar antidiscrimination
requirements in the past. 16 Conservatives and some moderates, on the other
hand, feared that discretion would give the President "a free hand to grant or
withhold funds when and where he pleases." 161 He could use that power for
political ends, I62 either to punish southern states• 63 or to gain control of matters historically reserved to the states. 164

°

Scope of Sanctions.

Both liberals and conservatives criticized the original version ofH.R. 7152 because they believed it could either authorize statewide termination of funds when only one locality had discriminated or a com-

158. For the original text of title VI, see note 148 supra ("no such law shall be interpreted as requir·
ing" financial assistance to discriminatory programs).
159. See President's Special Message to Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, June 19,
1963, 1963 Pus. PAPERS 483, 492, reprinted in House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1454 (un·
conditional withdrawal of all federal funds may penalize those who least deserve it without ending
discrimination); House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1465 (testimony of Secretary Wirtz) (in·
terpreting provision to give "discretionary authority" to administrators).
160. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 956-60, 971, 1133 (remarks of Re{l. Mathias)
(discussing government's failure to terminate contract for power plant on federal land despite contrac·
tor's violation of equal employment provisions).
161. /d. at 1715 (testimony of Rep. Watson of South Carolina); cf. id. at 1723 (testimony of Rep.
Seldin of Alabama) (expressing concern that President may use power for "other purposes" than help·
ing blacks).
162. See id. at 1716 (testimony of Rep. Watson) (foreseeing "string-pulling and coercion by the
administration in their effort to unpose their will on others"); cf. ld. at 1736-37 (testimony of Rep.
Waggonner of Louisiana) (criticizing bill because "pure equality is communism").
163. See id. at 2139 (statement of South Carolina attorney Douglas McKay, Jr.) (characterizing
power to withhold funds as extension of "government-by-threat").
164. See id. at 1522 (remarks of Rep. Meader of Michigan) (title VI may impair vitality of local
governments); id. at 1596 (testimony of Rep. Dorn of South Carolina) (every state and local govern·
ment could be coerced and intimidated by President); cf. ld. at 1733 (testimony of Rep. Waggonner)
(bill will rele~:~n~~te and local government to "ashcan of history"). Chairman Celler answered those
who feared a · · trative discretion by noting that mandatory eriforcement ''would be very difficult to
put in a law. . . . You would have to trust the (federal administrative] officials." /d. at 2233. Mr.
Celler later compromised See notes 183-206 infra and accompanying text (explaining development of
compromise position).
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plete funding denial for an entire program that had ·engaged in only isolated
and minor acts of discrimination. Even Chairman Emanuel Celler of New
York, who led the administration's forces, asked of one witness, "What degree
would the discrimination have to be before you issue that proscription: that no
Federal funds should be expended in those states? ... Where would all this
end?" 165 Members of both parties recognized that some discrimination existed .
in every state and that without some limitation on title VI sanctions, any state
could suffer a complete loss of federal funds because of discrimination by a
few program officers or political subdivisions.166

Judicial Review.
The lack of a provision for judicial review of funding
terminations also drew wide criticism. Most vociferous were southern members who ''would rather have an explicit provision denying completely such
funds" 167 than subject themselves to the federal administrators' unreviewable
discretion: "At least then we would still be under the rule of law and not the
rule of men . . . ." 168 Perhaps more important, the Republicans favoring a
civil rights bill supported an alternative to H.R. 7152 which contained a provision for judicial review.169

Definition of Discrimination.
The last problem was addressed by two
members present at the hearings who perceptively remarked that the word
"discrimination" had no fixed meaning 170 and was nowhere defin<?d in title
VI. 171 Although debaters did not use the modem jargon of "intentional" discrimination versus "impact" discrimination (or discriminatory "effects"), 172
165. House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1095 (remarks of Chairman Celler).
166. See id at 1512 (remarks of Cliairman Celler) (by implication) (alluding to pockets of discrimination in several local governments); id at 1504 (remarks of Judiciary Comm. Gen. Counsel Foley)
(describing desegregation cases in Ohio, Michigan, and New York); cf. id at 1093 (remarks of Rep.
McCulloch) (one of repeated references to previous problems arising from federal termination of grant
to Ohio).
Bills offered by several Republicans would have solved the problem of scope of termination by limiting coverage to employment contracts and allowing the administration to terminate only specific contracts upon proof of discrimination by an employee under that contract. See H.R. 3139, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. §211 (1963), reprinted in House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 72-73; H.R. 3144, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 211 (1963), reprinted in House Subcomm. Hearings, supra, at 129-30.
167. House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1716 (remarks of Rep. Watson of South Carolina).
168. Id; cf. id at 1735 (testimony of Rep. Waggonner) (civil rights proposals grant sweeping power
to one appointed individual).
169. A good indication of this came when Representative McCulloch of Ohio, leader of the Republicans favoring passage of a civil rights bill, phrased his questions to the southern representatives in a
manner designed to demonstrate the desirability of judicial review. See id at 1583 (question to Rep.
Dorn of South Carolina) (emphasizing unreviewable termination power of one individual); id at 1716
(question to Rep. Watson of South Carolina) (same); cf. id at 1547 (remarks while questioning HEW
Secretary Celebreeze) ("there is need for some review by somebody somewhere").
170. See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 106, reprinted in (1964) U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. News at 2473 (minority views of Reps. Poffand Cramer). A similar problem arose under title VII.
Id at 110-11, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News at 2477-78. The Supreme Court
resolved the interpretation problem for title VII in 1971. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971) (employment practice that has effect of excluding blacks prohibited unless related to job
performance).
171. Title III defined "desegregation," although not "discrimination." See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 654-65 (original text of title III, facilitating desegregation in public education).
The use in title III of the phrase "racial imbalance," however, tended to exacerbate concern about what
title VI covered. See note 173 infta (discussing confusion over meaning of racial imbalance).
172. See generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legis-
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several members expressed the same concerns in the catchwords of a different
decade: "racial imbalance." 173 The hearings show that several members were
concerned that "discrimination" might include mere racial imbalance, 174 especially since title III of the administration's bill, designed to end discrimination
in public education, specifically provided for special funding to alleviate the
problems of "racial imbalance." 175 These concerns became fears when Secretary Celebrezze of HEW seemed to imply in testimony that the use in title VI
of the word "discrimination" would incorporate the "racial imbalance" concept of title 111. 176
2. The Celebrezze Testimony on "Discrimination"
The Celebrezze testimony is the key to understanding the House's resolution
of the fourth criticism of the original version of title VI. Moreover, the Secretary's testimony explains the way in which the later, substitute version of H.R.
7152 encompassed a compromise position that met all four criticisms.
Under detailed cross-examination from Representative Cramer of Florida,
Secretary Celebrezze seemed to endorse racial balance as a goal of title VI. 177
As the exchange grew more heated, Chairman Celler cut off further Republican questioning. 178 Representative Rodino and Chairman Celler then tried to
defuse the situation by pointing out that the "racial imbalance" language did
/alive Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REv. 95 (one of first two articles, appearing well after passage of 1964 Act,
expounding intent-impact distinction); Ely, Legislative and Atfminislralive Motivalion in Conslllullonal
Law, 19 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970) (same).
173. Although Rep. Cramer complained that "racial imbalance" lacked a statutory definition, House
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1512, he and his colleagues appeared to understand the term
"racial imbalance" to mean statistically unequal representation of races due to housing patterns or
other private action, rather than to governmentally imposed segregation. See /d. at 1425 (remarks of
Rep. Cramer) (summarizing article submitted for record, detailing unbalanced housing patterns); id. at
1518 (remarks ofReJ>. Meader) (defining racial balance in terms of population statistics); cf. /d. at 1509
(testimony of HEW Secretary Celebrezze) (residential segregation lias resulted in de facto segregation
of schools). Because it was unclear whether the term connoted unintentional segregation or legally
imposed segregation, the Secretary's agreement to study the issue further only heightened some members' suspicions. See id. at 1516 (remarks of Rep. Cramer) ("You want us to give you a blank check •••
and we don't know what racial imbalance is, and you apparently don't know, yourself'').
174. See id. at 1424 (remarks of Rep. Cramer) (expressing particular concern over new concept of
discrimination known as racial imbalance); id. at 1580 (remarks of Rep. Meader) (expressing concern
that "if racial imbalance is discrimination," title VI could bestow unreasonably broad powers).
175. See id. at 654-55 (quoting text of original title III of H.R. 7152).
176. See id. at 1514-17 (testimony of HEW Secretary Celebrezze) (discussing title VI power to withhold funds in context of racial imbalance). Although Secretary Celebrezze suggested at one point that
the agency would scrutinize school zoning for racial imbalance only to determine if it were part of a
"scheme" to maintain segregation, he immediately expanded this statement by opining that "racial
imbalance in any community comes because of school district lines." /d. at 1514 (emphasis added). The
imprecision in defining racial imbalance, however, was not as alarming as the Secretary's tymg of
"racial imbalance" in title III with "discrimination" in title VI. Concern over the latter term dominated
the remainder of the subcommittee's discussion with Secretary Celebrezze. See /d. at 1516-33 (discussing implications of broad definition of "discrimination").
177. See id. at 1514 (responding that funds could be terminated for schools rejecting federal "assistance" to end imbalance if title VI passed). Representative Cramer inferred from the testimony that the
Secretary was claiming power to withhold all funds whenever he found racial imbalance./d. at 1518
(remarks of Rep. Cramer).
178. See id. at 1517-18 (remarks of Chairman Celler) ("I don't want the hearing prolonged wiili
unduly redundant questions").
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not appear in title VI itself, 179 but under questioning by Representative
Meader, Secretary Celebrezze again took the position that if HEW determined
after study that racial imbalance in a particular school system caused the same
problems as traditional segregation, then "steps will have to be taken under
title Vl." 180 The Secretary's statement followed an admission to Representative Cramer that "no court decision" had outlawed racial imbalance, 181 and·
made clear his view that any action against such imbalance under title VI
would arise from an executive, not a judicial, determination of what constitutes discrimination in any specific locality. 1B2
The Secretary's inability to clarify this critical issue for the Republican
members, at a time when Chairman Celler was trying to build broad bipartisan support for the Act, 183 led even the chairman to suggest that "[s]ome criteria might be added to this bill that would . . . help you in your determination
as to whether or not there was discrimination, or whether or not racial imbalance is the discrimination referred to in title Vl." 184 When Representative
Meader revived the issue, 185 the chairman again explicitly demanded that the
Secretary submit "some sort of guidelines under which you would have to operate with reference to title Vl."186
The brouhaha that led Chairman Celler to request that HEW suggest guidelines for construing title VI provided the ranking minority member, Representative McCulloch, an opportunity to argue once again for the Republicans' pet
provision-judicial review of title VI sanctions. 187 The chairman; however,
presented the case against judicial review. 1_88 Recalling a· number of instances
in which federal judges had taken two to seven years to decide desegregation
cases, Celler argued that "we would have to wait until doom's day before you
[the agency] can implement your decision." 189 The Secretary's agreement with
the chairman 190 manifested the administration's intent that title VI serve as a
vehicle not for judicial action, but rather for congressional, executive, and
agency action-and controJ.l91
179. See id at 1518 (remarks of Rep. Rodino) ("racial imbalance only appears in the title III"); id at
1519 (remarks of Chairman Celler) (no provision in title VI allows cutoff of funds for racial imbalance).
180. Id at 1519 (remarks of Secretary Celebrezze).
181. Id at 1517.
182. See id at 1514-17 (HEW investigation revealing segregationist scheme behind school zoning
would justify cutoff of funds).
183. See id at 908 (opening statement of Chairman Celler) ("I am confident that Congress will meet
its responsibility and further our program in a nonpartisan and unprejudiced fashion").
184. Id at 1521.
185. See id (noting that his state of Michigan had suffered from federal administrator's decision to
withhold funding for state programs).
·
186. Id at 1522.
187. See id at 1524 (remarks of Rep. McCulloch) (urging need for right to appeal "capricious" acts
of administrators).
.
188. See id at 1523 (remarks of Chairman Celler) (considering need for expeditious action, resort to
courts would be "very, very wrong").
189. Id
190. See id at 1533 (testimony of Secretary Celebrezze) (expressing complete agreement with chairman's statement concerning judicial review).
191. See id In the Secretary's view, "Congress can call in and question the administrator as to why
he acted in that way [in terminating funds], and if they find he acted in a malicious manner Congress
has a right to change the law. That is the check on it." Id

28

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

C.

1.

[Vol. 70:1

THE EMERGENCE OF COMPROMISE

The Ingrediep.ts of Success

At the close of hearings the subcommittee held seventeen days of mark-up in
executive session, 192 in which it altered H.R. 7152 in several substantial respects. Most importantly, the subcommittee decided to split off title VII and to
extend substantially its coverage from just federally funded employers to all
employers engaged in interstate commerce. 193 Placing title VII on its own constitutional footing allowed the subcommittee to consider in greater detail the
wide-ranging impact of title VI, which, with its spending power basis, applied
to all funding situations, not just employment. Separating out the employment
provision, of course, left the original version of title VI as a single sentence,
simply declaring the President's discretionary authority to withhold funds. 194
This single sentence, compared with the detailed provison that eventually
emerged from the full committee, 195 shows the exent of compromise reached to
meet the criticisms of H.R. 7152. A successful compromise would have had to
accomplish four major objectives: to make nearly mandatory the executive's
enforcement obligation while retaining some flexibility, as the Attorney General and Chairman Celler demanded; to limit the scope of any sanction so that
minor or localized acts of discrimination would not result in a cutoff of all
funds for a state; to provide for judicial review of sanctions while not robbing
· administrators of their ability to act quickly; and to reconcile seemingly irreconcilable views concerning whether title VI should reach only de jure discrimination or de facto discrimination as well. The subcommittee compromise
contained each of these necessary ingredients.l 96
The key to the compromise was the decision to authorize the executive departments and agencies to adopt their own regulations for enforcement of the
general antidiscrimination clause. 197 This new element allowed the remainder
of the compromise to fall neatly into place. First, in order to satisfy the liberals, the amended version made promulgation of implementing regulations
mandatory. 198 To accommodate the conservatives, however, the compromise
192. HousE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 44, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CoDE CoNo. & AD.
NEWS at 2413 (additional views of Rep. Meader).
,
193. See id at 66, reprinted in [1964) U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEWS at 2434 (minority report) (under
title VII EEOC should have power over businesses affecting commerce).
194. See note 148 supra (quoting original text of title VI).
195. The bill that emerged from the subcommittee moved from the full committee to the house floor
with only two changes: deletion of an explicit provision for enforcement via injunction, and deletion of
coverage of insurance contracts. See HousE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 85-86, reprinted in
[1964) U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 2454 (minority report) (discussing deletions).
196. HousE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 85-86, reprinted in [1964) U.S. CoDE CoNo. & AD.
NEWS at 2453-55 (minority report) (comparing reported bill with subcommittee proposal).
The compromise language apparently was drafted by the Department of Justice and accepted by the
subcommittee. See House Comm. Hearings, supra note 51, at 2703 (remarks of Rep. Brooks) (compromise language authorized by Attorney General's office and considered by committee). Although labeled "title VII" in this draft, it would regain its original title number upon passage. To avoid
confusion, reference to the provision throughout this discussion will be to title VI.
197. See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 85, reprinted in [1964) U.S. CODE CONO. &
AD. NEws at 2454 (minority report) (quoting text of provision granting enforcement authority); House
Suhcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 2703 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy) (agencies will
issue rules and regulations prior to cutoff to afford recipient opportunity to comply).
198. House Comm. Hearings, supra note 51, at 2732 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy).
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also required that the regulations be "consistent with the achievement of the
objectives" of the various underlying federal grant programs. 199 Moreover, the
amended version provided the executive branch flexibility in choosing the
means of enforcing the regulations and directed it to seek voluntary compliance before initiating formal sanctions.200 Second, these changes also helped to
satisfy those who sought to limit the scope of the funding termination. As
Attorney General Kennedy explained, the language requiring that terminations be "consistent with the achievement of the objectives" of the federal program would ensure that isolated acts of discrimination would not prompt an
agency to subvert an entire congressionally authorized program.201 The language of the termination provision, limiting termination to "such discriminatory programs,"202 would ensure that any cutoff would be limited to a
particular program, and would not be of statewide scope.203
Finally, the decision to adopt a general statutory principle to be supplemented with specific regulations facilitated a compromise on the issue of judicial review. 204 The subcommittee compromise envisioned a limited judicial
role: it did not require an agency to go to court to enforce its decision, but
permitted an aggrieved party to seek judicial review of the agency's action. 205
Most important in preserving the agency's power, and in preventing unwarranted delay through de novo judicial factfinding, this form of administrative
review allowed the agency's determination the benefit of the deferential "substantial evidence" test prevailing under the Administrative Procedure Act. 206
2. Regulatory Definition of "Discrimination"
The delegation of regulatory authority not only catalyzed compromise on
other issues, it also quieted some of the controversy concerning the final criticism of the bill, the lack of a definition of discrimination. Under intense questioning by Representative Mathias, Attorney General Kennedy pointedly
explained that the feared "breadth of delegation of rulemaking authority"2 0 7
199. See id at 2740-41 (discrimination against one individual would not cause cutoff to entire program); cf. id at 2740 (remarks of Rep. Willis) (funding termination can undercut federal program goals
by denying benefits to those who need them).
200. See id at 2740 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy) (agency should seek amicable solution
before resorting to cutoff of funding).
201. See note 199 supra (statement by Attorney General Kennedy); cf. House Comm. Hearings, supra
note 51, at 2739 (remarks of Rep. Ashmore) (expressing fear that innocent people would be harmed by
termination based on discrimination against one person); House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at
1890 (remarks of Chairman Celler) (same).
202. HousE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 85, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 2454 (minority report).
203. See House Comm. Hearings, supra note 51, at 2766 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy)
(regulations adopted for each grant program would provide procedure for funding review for that pro-

gr~.a~::~d at 2703 (''there is judicial review, which we didn't provide for in the original measure");
id at 2740 (each program has right to judicial review of agency finding of violation).
205. See id. at 2732 (remarks of Rep. Cramer) (discussing right to court determination when funds
withheld).
206. See 5 U.S. C. § 706 (1976) (providing standard of review under "substantial evidence" test); cf.
House Comm. Hearings, supra note 5 I, at 2732 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy) (acknowledging that under judicial review court would apply "substantial evidence" test, not "preponderance of
evidence" test).
207. House Comm. Hearings, supra note 51, at 2765 (remarks of Rep. Mathias).
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was necessary because "there are so many different programs" and "to try to
write out something specifically in legislation as to what should be done, and
what rules and regulations would be issued is virtually impossible."20B As if
responding to Chairman Celler's original criticism that title VI lacked standards defining discrimination, Kennedy pointed out that the "particular [federal] program, with that [antidiscrimination principle of section 601] as a
general criterion to follow, will establish the rules that will be followed in the
administration of the program-so that the recipients of the program will understand what they can or cannot do." 2 09
The compromise on the definition of discrimination constituted a decision to
confer on another body-the executive agencies-the final power to determine
the meaning of the word. Although the subcommittee at the same time struck
out the references to "racial imbalance" in title III,2 10 the committee members
were quite aware that elimination of that phrase from title III provided no
clarification of the meaning of title VI. The Minority Report on the bill characterized the delegation to the agencies as "a matter of 'public relations,' "211
and accurately predicted that the administration would "rely upon its own
construction of 'discrimination' as including the lack of racial balance,"212 as
agencies had done in regulations enforcing previous antidiscrimination legislation. 2 13 The majority did not take issue with that interpretation of the
compromise.214
208. Id at 2765-66 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy).
209. Id at 2740 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy). The following colloquy, in which the
Attorney General outlined the changes made in the original version of title VI, shows the importance of
the regulation-making authority in reaching a bipartisan compromise on the title:
Attorney General Kennedy . . . . I think first the fact you have judicial review-and the
second-the strong point is that the fact that the rules and regulations dealing with the problem are set out so that everybody understands it. Everybody understands what regulations
they have to meet, what rufes they have to follow, if they are going to receive the aid and
assistance.

Mr. Ashmore. Rules and regulations are the things I am opposed to.
Attorney General Kennedy. I understand, Congressman, but it is set forth now. And that I
think is better than originally.

Mr. Ashmore. What are the conditions now since it has been modified?
Attorney General Kennedy. What it sets forth is that basically there will not be discrimination in the expenditures of any funds, there will not be discrimination against any individual
based on his color or his country of origin. The particular program, with that as a general
criterion to follow, will establish the rules that will be followed in the administration of the
program-so that the recipients of the program will understand what they can or cannot do.
Then if there is a problem, if they feel that-if there is a breakdown and there is an allegation
that they have violated the rules, then there can be judicial review. So I think that is an
advantage of the program-although there is still strong criticism about it.

Id
210. See House JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 81-84, reprinted In (1964) U.S. CoDE CONO. &
AD. News at 2450-52 (minority report) (discussing text oftitle III reported out by subcommittee, omitting reference to racial imbalance).
211. Id at 67, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CoDE CoNo. & AD. News at 2436.
212. Id at 68, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. News at 2436.
213. See id (citing broad language in standards proposed in 1963 by Secretary of Labor concerning
union apprenticeship programs).
214. The silence of the committee report on the issue of interpreting discrimination is not surprising
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3. Fine Tuning and Passage
The version of title VI that emerged from the subcommittee, which the full
committee altered only slightly,215 contained all ofthe essential elements that
the full Congress later adopted and that President Johnson signed into law.21 6
The few amendments that Congress accepted tended to strengthen and confirm
the compromise rather than alter it. Representative Lindsay's one-sentence
amendment on the House floor, for example, required that all regulations
promulgated under title VI be approved by the President,2I7 thereby ensuring
that, on the "important" and volatile issue of discrimination, the highest political sensitivity would serve to control bureaucratic discretion in rulemaking.21 8
Thus, the amendment tended to ameliorate the one shortcoming of the billthat administrative discretion could go unchecked. Another provision in the
final House version required notice to the House and Senate committees responsible for the particular programs before funds could be withheld.2 19 This
addition reinforced the thrust of the Lindsay amendment, further demonstrating Congress' belief that the legislators ultimately ought to determine for
themselves whether sanctions should, as a political matter, be enforced against
certain grantees. Similarly; a Senate-initiated amendment implicitly ratifYing
one element of the compromise made absolutely clear the provision that an
agency could terminate funds only to a program in which discrimination was
found. 220 Senator Humphrey summarized the work of the Senate by declaring,
"We have made no changes of substance in title VI . . . ."221
in light of Chairman Celler's attempt to cool tempers and minimize the issue during the Celebreeze
testimony before the subcommittee. See text accompanying notes 118-84supra (discussing Celebreeze
testimony). In the subcommittee hearings Joseph Rauh, testifying in favor of passage of the bill, felt the
stem hand of the chairman who did not want to let Rauh reopen the issue of racial imbalance: "I
think," said Rep. Celler, interrupting Rauh, ''you ought to give that a little more time before you
present an opinion on that, because there are lots to be said on both sides." "I was going to be careful,"
replied Rauh, sheepishly. HoliSe Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1889. In light of the Chairman's
stated view that he preferred "to give the widest kind of discretion" to administrators in dealing with
the "wholesale variety of cases,"id. at 1890, the provision in the revised bill for formalized rulemaking
represented a workable compromise, obviating any need to mention racial imbalance. Cf. id. at 1521
(remarks of Chairman Celler) (bill should contain standards consistent with need for flexibility to govern agency action).
215. See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 85-86, reprinted in (1964] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 2453-55 (minority report) (comparing reported bill with subcommittee proposal).
216. Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1976)).
217. See 110 CoNG. REc. 2499 (1964) (quoting Lindsay amendment).
218. See id. (remarks of Rep. Lindsay) ("latitude" of regulatory power creates need for presidential
approval). Representative Lindsay's constituents_in New York were among those who could have been
most affected by an administrator's decision to adopt "racial imbalance" as the test for discrimination
under title VI. See HoliSe Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1512 (remarks of Chairman Celler of
New York City) (discussing serious racial imbalance in New York).
219. See 110 CONG. REc. 16,001 (1964) (comparing House version to Senate version of title VI).
220. See id. at 14,219-20 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Holland) (listing changes made to House version).
The Senate, however, made substantial changes in parts of the 1964 Act other than title VI. Id at
14,219 (remarks of Sen. Holland).
221. Id. at 12,714 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Many of the arguments. presented earlier in the
House subcommittee hearing resurfaced in tlie Senate but resulted in no significant amendments. For
example, to charges from relative moderates that title VI omitted definitional standards for guiding
those who would administer the law, id. at 12,320 (remarks of Sen. Byrd of West Virginia), and allowed
"lesser appointed officials" to determine what constitutes discrimination, id. at 13,130 (remarks of Sen.
Gore), proponents responded not with denials but with assurances that procedural safeguards would
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Although Senate proponents of title VI repeatedly invoked constitutional
principles to support section 601 of the bill,222 they did so under a barrage of
equally lofty attacks from senators who deemed the bill "clearly unconstitutional."223 The senior chamber heard Senator Byrd of West Virginia raise the
volatile issue whether section 602 would permit regulations to correct "racial
imbalance," a fear shared by many southemers.224 He condemned the regulations as tools ''whereby the Federal Government can force whatever sociological concepts may strike the fancy of those in power'' upon local grantees.22S
Instead of precluding the "racial imbalance" test by defining discrimination,226
however, the Senate dealt narrowly with racial balance only by prohibiting
school busing orders to achieve it.227 This so-called Javits amendment, no
more than a minor limitation on the possible scope of the definition of discrimination, reinforces the conclusion that Congress intended to confer wide discretion on agencies by giving them rulemaking authority.22s
D.

SUBSEQUENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS! TITLE VI AND ITS ANALOGUES

The peculiarly legislative and administrative-rather than constitutionalreduce the resulting harm. See id at 13,128-30 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoft) (explaining safeguards, including limited funds termination and judicial review).
222. See, e.g., id at 5253 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (discrimination in use of federal funds
"clearly violative of the Constitution''); id at 13,333 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoft) ("basically, there is a
constitutional restriction against discrimination in the use of Federal funds"); id (remarks of Sen.
Morse) (use of federal funds in discriminatory programs "unconstitutional"); id at 13,334 (remarks of
Sen. Pastore) (same). The senators, however, were not always meticulous in their use of constitutional
rhetoric; Senator Humphrey, the bill's floor manager, once asserted that title II (private accommodations) and title VII (private employment) "protect the rights already guaranteed in the Constitution,"
id at 5252, a demonstrably false assertion. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883) (fourteenth
amendment does not reach private discrimination). These Senators, by invoking constitutional principle, may have been thinking of their Article 1-type constitutional power to legislate on these issues. See
110 CoNG. REc. 5252 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (discussing authority of Congress).
Senate proponents, in any event, knew that in some ;:espects title VI might cover fewer areas than
would the Constitution. See id at 5255 (Case-Humphrey colloquy demonstrating that exclusion of
insurance contracts in§ 602 would, in effect, limit scope of§ 601). The narrow question of whether the
Senators intended section 601 to be absolutely coterminous with the Constitution, therefore, cannot be
answered affirmatively.
223. 110 CoNG. REc. 13,383 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); see id at 5233 (remarks of Sen. Long)
("no business passing this unconstituti.onallaw"); if. id at 13,416 (remarks of Sen. Talmadge) (title
would create veritable "dictatorship''); id at 13,417 (remarks of Sen. Stennis) (same).
The constitutional rhetoric of both proponents and opponents reached its height during the limited
period of heated debate following invocation of cloture. See generally id at 13,327-418 (post-cloture
debate).
224. See notes 173-74 supra (House subcommittee discussions on racial imbalance).
225. 110 CoNG. REc. 12,321 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Byrd).
226. The Senate rejected an amendment by Senator Long that would have defined the term in another title of the Act See id at 12,320 (Amendment No. 764 to title II) (discrimination means "any
arbitrary and unreasonable differentiation in the treatment regularly and habitually accorded" to
groups covered by title).
227. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. IV, 78 Stat. 248-49 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1976));see
110 CoNG. REc. 12,717 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (assuring Sen. Byrd that "there is no case" in which
statute would require federal funds be "directed toward restoring or bringing about a racial balance in
the schools").
228. Cf. Drummond v. Acree, 409 U.S. 1228 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1972). Justice Powell refused a
stay, id at 1231, under a statute that required postponement of busing orders made to achieve racial
balance. Id at 1229. He reasoned that the lower court's order was designed to achieve not racial balance, but desegregation. Id at 1231. ''If Congress had desired ••. [a wider result] it could have used
clear and explicit language appropriate to that result." Id at 1229.

1981]

TITLE

VI

AND "DISCRIMINATION"

33

approach that Congress brought to bear on title VI in 1964 resurfaced in later
congressional attempts to deal with civil rights through use of the spending
power. A number of amendments to title VI failed to change the 1964 compromise,229 and, more importantly, a series of new pieces of legislation accentuated Congress' acceptance of, and reliance on, that compromise.230
1.

Subsequent Amendments to Title VI

Congress has amended the 1964 version of title VI on three occasions. Each
arose in connection with education aid statutes, not in the course of direct and
substantial review of title VI itself. The first two amendments, passed in
1966231 and 1968,232 manifested congressional concern with HEW's first serious enforcement efforts. The department had begun to defer new funding requests of grantees thought to be engaged in discrimination, rather than
terminating existing funding233 as had been originally contemplated.234 The
1966 amendment limited the period that the agency could defer requests without holding a hearing and making express findings of discrimination. 235 The
1968 amendment arose amid fears that HEW might move more diligently than
the courts in providing remedies for southern school segregation; Congress responded narrowly by providing that compliance with an outstanding court decree would constitute compliance with title VI. 236 Significantly, the
amendment said nothing about schools not under court decree and did not
even apply to those aspects of a system not covered by a decree. 237 Moreover,
even for schools under court order, the amendment made no practical difference because circuit courts had already ruled that HEW's guidelines were only
minimum standards.23 8 Court decrees, therefore, tended to be stricter than
HEW's standards, and not laxer, as the amendment's sponsors
contemplated.239
229. Compare Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit VI, 78 Stat. 252 (1964) (original compromise as enacted) with
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) (current version, incorporating amendments concerning fund deferral, compliance with federal court orders, and uniform application of dese&regation guidelines).
230. See notes 254-67 i'!fra and accompanying text (discussing title VI anaiogues).
231. Pub. L. No. 89-750, tit. I,§ 182, 80 Stat. 1209 (1966) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-5 (Supp. III
1979)) (education funding act).
232. Pub. L. No. 90-247, tit. I, § 112, 81 Stat. 787 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-5 (Supp. III
1979)) (proviso clause) (education funding act).
233. 112 CoNG. REc. 25,573-74 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Fountain of North Carolina, author of
amendment); id at 25,574-75 (remarks of Rep. Abbitt of Virginia).
234. See 110 CoNG. REc. 13,128-30 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoft) (explaining enforcement steps
originally contemplated under title VI).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-5 (Supp. III 1979).
236. Id (proviso clause).
237. S. REP. No. 726, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in (1967] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS
2730, 2743; CoNF. REP. No. 1049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 46, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD.
NEWS 2814, 2817.
.
.
238. See Singleton II, 355 F.2d. at 869 (guidelines only minimum standards of general application);
notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text (explaining courts' interpretation of guidelines).
239. A disturbing historical anomaly can oe seen in the early days after passage of the 1964 Act.
Debates in the House on the 1966 amendment to the Act disclosed that the members of the originating
committee, the Committee on Education and Labor, then understood that title VI forbade only intentional racial discrimination, not "de facto racial imbalance as such." 112 CoNG. REc. 25,551 (1966)
(remarks of Rep. Goodell); see id at 25,549-54 (remarks of Reps. O'Hara & Waggonner) (title VI does
not bar de facto racial imbalance). Because the 1964 compromise had originated in a different committee, the Judiciary Committee, it is not surprising that representatives on the substantive education com-
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The Stennis Amendment240 is more difficult to interpret. It was added in
1970 after the Supreme Court, in Green v. County School Board,241 apparently
adopted an effects test for proving continuing equal protection violations in
formerly de jure systems. 242 Pressed originally by southerners in Congress who
thought that courts were attacking de facto discrimination in the South while
leaving it untouched in the North,243 the proposal sought to ensure one nationwide desegregation policy without specifying what that policy should be.244
The opponents suspected that the bill was only a ploy to undermine continuing
desegregation efforts in the South.245 This was a reasonable suspicion in light
of both the sponsors' thinly veiled expectations that northern politicians would
never permit a policy of attacking de facto discrimination, as well as the
southerners' assertions that de jure discrimination had already been eliminated
mittee did not fully understand the scope of title VI. These representatives did not in 1966 offer an
amendment incorporating their views directly into title VI, leaving unresolved the question whether the
full Congress would have adopted their position.
The actual provision enacted, the O'Hara Amendment, insofar as it related to HEW's use of an
effects test, prevented federal officials only from using their grant powers to require transportation to
cure "racial imbalance." Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 181, 80 Stat. 1209 (1966) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232a
(1976)) (now covering all educational aid programs). The legislation was precipitated by congressional
concern that HEW officials were using title VI authority to intrude into local educational decisionmaking. E.g., 112 CONG. REC. 25,549, 25,550-51 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Waggonner); id. (remarks of Rep.
Powell); id. at 25,554 (remarks of Rep. Anderson). Another amendment, the Fino Amendment, explicitly would have forbidden HEW from reimbursing local districts for expenses incurred directly or indirectly in transr.;rting pupils to achieve racial balance. I d. at 25,553; see id. at 25,554 (remarks of Rep.
Anderson) (0 Hara Amendment would allow HEW to indirectly require busing by ordering rezoning;
Fino Amendment would not). But see id. at 25,551 (remarks of Rep. O'Hara) (HEW may not condition
grants on eliminating racial imbalance). The more specific Fino amendment failed. Id. at 25,555.
Courts interpreting the amended statute have avoided a resolution of the issue by resorting to a
constitutional basis for decision. See Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 456 F.2d. 552, 554-55
(5th Cir. 1972) (upholding court-ordered busing plan under fourteenth amendment; rejecting argument
that§ 1232a forbids such busing); if. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16-18
(1971) (title IV of Civil Rights Act does not withdraw from courts "historic equitable remedial powers"). The adoption in 191'0 of the Stennis Amendment, Pub. L. No. 91-230, !:j 2, 84 Stat. 121 (1970)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6 (1976)), rendered the 1966 debate somewhat insignificant by contemplating, although not specifically authorizing, application of an effects test. See I d. (title VI requires that
"such other policy as may be provided pursuant to law [be] applied uniformly to de facto segregation
wherever fonnd").
240. Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 2, 84 Stat. 121 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6 (1976)).
430 (1968).
241. 391
242. See id. at 439-42 (quoting with approval Jud_ge Sobeloffs results-conscious language in Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Crr. 1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring)). See generally
The Supreme Court. 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 111-18 (1968) (discussing Green and freedom-ofchoice plans).
243. See 116 CoNG. REc. 1267 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Stennis) (discussing motivation behind
amendment).
244. See id. at 1266 (remarks of Sen. Stennis). The original amendment provided that:

u.s.

It is the policy of the United States that &uidelines and criteria established pursuant to title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sectiOn 182 of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Amendments of 1966 shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States in dealing
with conditions of segregation by race in the schools of the local educational agencies of any
State without regard to origin or cause of such segregation.
·

I d.
245. See, e.g., id. at 2744-45 (remarks of Sen. Pastore) (voicing objection to amendment if it would be
used to continue segregation); id. at 2935-36 (remarks of Sen. Hatfield) (voicing fear that under amendment there would be no enforcement of Civil Rights Act); iri. at 2935 (remarks of Sen. Case) (disagreeing with contention that segregation in North justifies diminution of pressure for desegregation in
South).
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in their region.246
The House-Senate conference, however, so altered the scope of the bill that
its sponsors thereafter repudiated it. The major offending provision defined
"uniformity" as one desegregation policy applied uniformly nationwide to de
jure segregation, and another policy "as may be provided pursuant to law"
applied uniformly to de facto segregation.247 Because this preserved the very
de facto-de jure distinction that southerners believed harmed them and protected the North and West, southerners objected.248 They lost,249 and therevised Stennis Amendment, disowned by its father, became law.
It would be supportive to argue that the Stennis Amendment, like the 1966
and 1968 amendments, ratified the 1964 compromise by adopting an administrative solution to defining discrimination. Yet, the best interpretation of these
amendments is more complex. During the consideration of each bill several
speakers expressed the view that title VI outlawed only intentional discriminatiOn,250 showing neither appreciation of the 1964 compromise nor familiarity
with HEW's regulations, which had adopted an effects test. 251 This is not surprising, because these amendments did not come from the Judiciary Committee, which had originally drafted title VI. 252 Moreover, all regulatory
enforcement had taken place in southern schools that had been segregated
under admittedly de jure systems. The Congressional utterances from 1966
through 1970 were more statements of what HEW had done rather than what
it, under authority of title VI, might yet do.
Whatever some in Congress might have wanted to do, they in actuality accomplished little. The 1966 and 1968 amendments changed no part of the
1964 compromise, and the Stennis Amendment was seen by all in 1970 as more
hot air than legislation, its author admitting that he offered it 'Just as a statement of policy, hoping it will have influence on HEW in applying these guidelines."253 Although Congress has never explicitly reaffirmed its 1964 decision,
it has not mustered a majority to reverse the initial decision to defer to agency
authority in defining discrimination. Obfuscation, sometimes calculated, has
preserved the status quo.
246. See id. at 2550 (remarks of Sen. Stennis) (agreeing with Sen. Ervin that "what is sauce for the
New York gander is not sauce for the southern goose"). See also id. at 2546-65 (remarks of Sen.
Stennis and other supporters of an anti-busing amendment) (identifying extensive segregation in the
North).
247. /d. at 10,005. Compare note 244 supra (quoting text of original Stennis amendment) with 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-6 (1976) (revised Stennis amendment). The revised amendment added that "[s]uch
uniformity refers to one policy applied uniformly to de jure segregation wherever found and such other
policy as may be provided pursuant to law applied uniformly to de facto segregation wherever found."
42 u.s.c. § 2000d-6(b) (1976).
248. See 116 CONG. REc. 10,000 (remarks of Sen. Stennis) (criticizing conference action); id. at
10,006 (remarks of Sen. Talmadge) (same); id. at 10,014 (remarks of Sen. Cooper) (same). On the other
hand, those legislators suspicious of _Senator Stennis' intentions argued that the conference report was
true to the Senate's initial demand for uniformity in application of law: separate policies regarding de
facto and de jure discrimination would apply uniformly nationwide. See id. at 10,009 (remarks of
Senator Javits) (suiJporting conference report).
249. 116 CoNG. REc. 10,020 (recorded" vote on motion to recommit conference report).
250. See note 239 supra (discussing House debate on amendments).
251. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (Supp.l966) (prohibiting recipients from using criteria that have "the
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination").
252. See note 239 supra.
253. 116 CoNG. REc. 1001 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Stennis).
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2. Title VI Analogues
More illuminating than subsequent congressional action on title VI itself has
been Congress' penchant for using that title as a model for other legislation
passed under the spending power. These subsequent bills were passed to protect beneficiaries of federally funded programs from other types of discrimination, specifically that based on sex,254 handicap,255 and age.2S 6 In each of these
new statutes Congress again used the word "discrimination," and in each instance it became increasingly apparent that Congress intended to allow the
meaning to vary from the judicial interpretation of the equal protection clause
by having agency administrators promulgate definitive regulations.
The first provision emulating title VI, title IX of the Higher Education
Amendments of 1972,257 contains a virtually verbatim adoption of the 1964
compromise elements: funding termination limited to particular programs,
presidential review, notice to Congress, and agency power to promulgate regulations.258 Enacted after seven years of experience with HEW's regulations and
guidelines, however, and in an area in which there was probably even less
254. See Education Amendment ofl972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX,§ 901, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976)) (prohibiting sex: discrimination in certain education programs).
255. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, tit. V, § 504, 87 Stat. 393 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979)).
256. See Age Discrimination Act ofl975, Pub. L. No. 94-135, tit. III,§ 303, 89 Stat. 728 (codified at
42 u.s.c. § 6102 (1976)).
257. 20 u.s.c. §§ 1681, 1682 (1976).
258. Id Title IX provides, in part:
(a) Prohibition against discrimination; exceptions.
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex:, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
Id § 1681 (exceptions omitted). It provides, further:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial
assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a
contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of
section 1681 of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations,
or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives
of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the
President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected
(l) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to contmue assistance under such program or
activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after
opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or
refusal shall be limited, to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as
to whom such a finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular
program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other
means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the
department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure
to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by
voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue,
assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section,
the head of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and
Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report.
Id § 1682. The provision for judicial review also mimics title VI. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (1976)
(review provision using title VI language) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1976) (title VI review provision).
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consensus about the meaning of discrimination,259 the general prohibitory language echoing section 601 of title VI was supplemented by numerous exceptions.260 Although these exceptions limited the scope of the statute, Congress
did not preclude use of an effects test. 261 Later analogues to title VI follow the
same general pattern of title IX.262
The most persuasive indication that Congress did not intend the language of
title VI, as repeated in the analogues, to adopt the constitutional definition of
discrimination lies in the subject matter of the analogues. Even before passage
of the Age Discrimination Act, the Supreme Court held that claims of age
discrimination arising under the equal protection clause would be subjected
only to "rational basis" scrutiny,263 scrutiny that has led to the Court's invalidation of virtually no state action since the beginning of two-tier analysis in
the 1960's.264 Yet Congress surely intended that its statute prohibit something
259. The Supreme Court in 1972 had not agreed upon a J>rotective constitutional standard of review
for sex classifications, having purported to rely only on the old "rational basis" test when it struck down
a discriminatory statute. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (statute favoring men over women as administrators of estates violates equal protection clause because classification not reasonably
related to object of legislation). In 1973 four members of the Court found sex, like race, a "suspect
classification" requiring "strict scrutiny." See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plurality opinion) (statute granting automatic benefits to dependents of men but not women in military
violates due process clause). Three years later a Court majority adopted a less strict, although still
demanding, level of review. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender classifications must
serve "important governmental objectives" and be "substantially related to those objectives"). The
contours of the Craig test, however, are far from clear. Compare Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
384-85 (1979) (S-4 decision) (statute permitting unwed mother but not father to withhold adoption
consent represents overbroad generalization in gender-based classification and thus violates equal protection clause) with Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 348-49 (1979) (S-4 decision) (statute permitting
unwed mother but not father, if mother alive, to sue for wrongful death of child not an overbroad
generalization violating equal protection clause). See also Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2658
(1981) (statute requiring only men to register for draft does not violate due process clause because
women not similarly situated).
260. See Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX,§ 90l(a), 86 Stat. 373 (1972) (excepting from coverage certain
religious, military, and traditionally single-sex institutions). The current version of title IX contains
further exceptions. See 20 U.S.C. § 168l(a)(l)-(9) (1976) (excepting fraternities, beauty pageant scholarships, voluntary youth organizations, and others).
261. Indeed, the language used in section 1618(b), 20 U.S.C. § 168l(b) (1976), closely paralleled
language in title VII of the 1964 act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976), which the Supreme Court had
previously construed to authorize an effects test for defining discrimination. See Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (title VII prohibits employment practices that are-discriminatory in
operation).
262. There are some variations. Section 504, which protects handicapped persons, contains none of
the explicit compromise provisions seen in title VI. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979). Congress
legislated there, however, against the background of a pre-existing statutory scheme of aid to handicapped persons, which already embodied single-agency enforcement with wide regulatory authority.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (previous aid-to-handicapped scheme). The Age
Discrimination Act (ADA) manifests an even greater deference to agency expertise, especially that of
HEW. The ADA authorizes agencies to define "discrimination," 42 U.S.C § 6101 (Supp. III 1979), in
two stages: first by "general" regulations drafted by HEW after consultation with the Civil Rights
Commission, id. § 6103(a) (1976), and then by "enforcement" regulations drafted by each affected
agency which were to be "consistent" with the general regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(4) (Supp. III
1979). Regarding the scope and use of agency power under the Age Discrimination Act, see Schuck,
Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27 (1979).
263. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314, 317 (1976) (per curiam)
(statute requiring retirement of state police officers at age 50 does not violate rational basis standard).
264. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 8, at 671 (discussing advent of "strict scrutiny" to replace
rational basis test in certain circumstances). Cases such as Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which
claimed to impose rational-basis scrutiny, appeared later to h11-ve..been the products of greater scrutiny.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (Reed showed that Court subjects
sex classifications to greater scrutiny than ordinarily imposed when suspect classes not involved); Fron-
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more than the lunatic or wholly irrelevant actions outlawed by rational basis
scrutiny. Similarly, although the Supreme Court has never made explicit the
level of review applicable to constitutional claims of discrimination against
handicapped persons,265 and apparently has adopted a fluid, balancing approach to constitutional claims of sex discrimination, 266 Congress intended its
title VI analogues in those areas to go beyond minimal constitutional balancing with stronger rules against discrimination. 267 In short, Congress in the
1970's understood the phraseology and pattern already employed in title VI to
allow agencies to attack discriminatory actions that do not violate judicial conceptions of constitutional equal protection.
E.

LESSONS FROM THE DRAFTING OF TITLE VI

The wording and legislative history of title VI point inexorably toward two
conclusions: (1) Congress did not intend to adopt a discrimination standard
that would necessarily mimic constitutional equal protection doctrine, and (2)
Congress intended to give interpretive control over title VI to federal agencies,
while retaining some supervisory power for itself.
The compromise that produced title VI showed a peculiarly legislative approach to defining discrimination, which contradicts the proposition that constitutional equal protection notions alone should provide the standards for title
VI. In some respects the bill patently differed from the Constitution by offering less secure safeguards. Most pertinently, the limitation that agency regulations must "be consistent with the objectives" of the underlying federal
program introduced a political balancing into title VI to prevent broad findings of violation based on isolated acts. Similarly, the Lindsay Amendment
requirement of presidential approval of regulations also showed that Congress
wanted executive-political-action to control the discretion inherent in defining discrimination. In other respects, title VI permitted agency regulations to
exceed constitutional standards, as shown by Congress' awareness that agencies might define "discrimination" so as to attack de facto discrimination not
forbidden by judicial construction of the Constitution.
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion) (Reed's "departure from 'traditional'
rational basis analysis" clearly justified); G. GuNTHER, supra, at 867 n.2 (Reed represents level of
scrutiny between "rational basis" test and "strict scrutiny"). See generally Gunther, In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Mode/for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972)
(discussing different levelS of scrutiny).
265. For a discussion of the issue, see Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The
Qualifications of Handicapped Persons As A "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15
SANTA CLARA LAW. 855 (1975).
266. See note 259 supra (describing disposition of sex discrimination cases).
267. The Supreme Court has never decided the scope of title IX, having dealt only narrowly with the
right of private beneficiaries to sue under the statute. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
61'7, 717 (1979) (finding implied private right of action under title IX).
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, title V, has received Supreme Court attention only once, in South·
eastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), in which the Court construed the affirmative
action language somewhat narrowly. See id at 413 (statute requires only that institutions not exclude
on basis of handicap, not that they make major adjustments to accommodate handicapped). Apparently, however, the Court's reading of the statute would require more of grantees than the Constitution
would require under a rational basis test.
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In title VI, therefore, as in many other titles of the 1964 Act,26S Congress
drew upon the inspiration provided by the Constitution and Brown v. .Board of
Education. Rather than apply the principle blindly in new areas, however, it
fashioned practical new legislative contours to the antidiscrimination
consensus.
Finally, constitutional law is, of course, judicial law, and even clearer than
Congress' appreciation that title VI could vary from constitutional law is its
intent that the title vary from law as made by judges. Congress chose not to
make the principles of section 601 subject to judicial interpretation and enforcement, but rather decided that "what [grantees] can and cannot do" 269
would be defined in regulations drafted by agencies and executive departments. Moreover, Congress rendered these agencies and departments responsible both to the President, who would review the regulations, and to Congress,
which could negate their regulations through legislation. The only role assigned to courts was to provide judicial review under the standards applicable
to any ordinary agency action. This limited judicial role negates any idea that
Congress intended to adopt the judiciary's constitutional standards as the
touchstone for title VI.21o

III.

TOWARD A TRADITIONAL REGULATORY MODEL OF TITLE
A.

VI

INTRODUCTION

The preceding discussion refutes two predominant views of title VI. The
first, argued by several white-dominated civil rights groups in 1964, is that by
enacting title VI Congress was only performing its constitutional duty. 271 This
view, however, was never fashionable in the courts, and the legislative history
suggests that it does not accurately reflect congressional intent. The second
view, recently adopted by several justices of the Supreme Court, is that Congress, in choosing from a range of possible definitions, adopted verbatim for
title VI the Court's constitutional standards of discrimination. 272 .Legislative
history indicates that this view is also incorrect and ahistorical. This article
has argued instead that Congress chose to avoid defining discrimination by
vesting in agencies that power and responsibility.
Although the standards set forth by title VI may differ in scope from the
judiciary's equal protection rules, the problem of judicial-administrative inter268. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-c (1976) (title II provisions on public accommodations); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) (title VII provisions on employment discrimination). _
269. House Comm. Hearings, Sllpra note 51, at 2740 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy).
270. Although other governmental organs than courts have a duty to consider constitutional issues in
making their decisions, see Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,
27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975), we have come to think of the federal courts as final arbiters or ultimate
intepreters of the Constitution. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-04 (1974) (Court has
authority to determine Constitution grants privilege to executive); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
548-49 (1969) (determination of Constitutional right to sit in Congress within traditional role of courts).
At the very least, therefore, it would seem curious for Congress to adopt judicially declared constitutional rules as standards for agency decisions, and then relegate judicial review to the stand-by position
it occupies in reviewing ordinary statutory cases. C.f. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 & n.8 (1965)
(Supreme Court will examine for itself facts that implicate application of constitutional law); Fiske v.
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385 (1927) (same).
271. See note 46 st~pra (discussing split among different civil rights groups).
272. See note 12 Sllpra and accompanying text.
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play remains because courts may be asked to review an agency's application of
its regulations273 or to hear private suits invoking the provisions of title VJ,274
This problem is especially complex because agencies, particularly HEW, have
adopted two kinds of rules: formal regulations and interpretive guidelines.275
Only the former have received presidential approval,276
B.

COURTS AND REGULATIONS

I. Judicial Standard of Review

Although this article has concluded that Congress adopted a traditional regulatory model for title VI, the inquiry into its application is not complete. A
review of the passage of title VI helps to determine what kind. of agency
rulemaking power the statute confers and whether an agency has exercised it
properly. The full Supreme Court has not confronted these issues,277 but a
concurring group of three justices addressed the problem in Lau v. Nichols and
273. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1976) (subjecting department or agency action under title VI to judicial review).
274. C.f. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (implying private right of action
under title IX because title patterned after title VI); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (allowing
class action by students against school district under title VI).
275. HEW developed a multi-tiered system of "regulations" and "guidelines," as well as "policy
interpretations," "procedural announcements," and "decision announcements" (agency case digests).
See 43 Fed. Reg. 18,630 (1978) (promulgating policy determinations); note 327 i'!fra (citing policy
digests). HEW enforced as law memoranda and task force reports construing the regulations. See U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS AND
LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENTS: IDENTIFICATION OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE ASSIGN·
MENT OF CHILDREN TO SPECIAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS (August 1975) (listing examples of possible
violations of titles VI and VII) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC. & WELFARE, TASK FORCE FINDINGS SPECIFYING REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR ELIMINATING
PAST EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES RULED UNLAWFUL UNDER Lou V. Nichols (Summer 1975) (discussing
specific procedures in remedial bilingual education programs) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Jour·
nat). The Task Force Findings, in particular, reveal tlie flexibility oftlie lawmaking process. Although
this document purports only to propose remedies for prior violations, tlie agency uses the requirements
in determining whetlier violations exist. The agency also considers any program not meeting the standards required of formerly discriminating programs to be guilty of discrimination. Statement to author
by Ellen Myasato, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, May 10, 1981
(formerly Special Assistant to Director of Office for Civil Rights, HEW).
276. See U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Title IX oftlie Education Amendments of 1972; A
Policy Interpretation; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979) (signed by Director of Office for Civil Rights and Secretary of HEW); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, Eouc. & WELFARE,
GUIDELINES FOR ELIMINATING DISCRIMINATION AND DENIAL OF SERVICES ON THE BASIS OF RACE,
COLOR, NATIONAL ORIGIN, SEX, AND HANDICAP IN VOCATIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, 45 C.F.R.
§ 80 app. B (1980) (published in 44 Fed. Reg. 17,164-68 (1979)) (signed by Director of Office for Civil
Rights). These materials sometimes appear in tlie Federal Register, obviating the problem of public
notice, but sometimes such interpretive materials are not published. Should a guideline be approved by
a president, and meet tlie procedural and publication requirements generally applicable to regulations,
tliat guideline would fall witliin tlie analytical definition of regulation for purposes of tlie discussion
following in text.
277. In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), tlie majority upheld tlie constitutionality of title VI as
supplemented by regulations and guidelines, id at 568-69, but did not specifically address the narrower
issue whetlier tlie regulations were consistent with tlie statute. Similarly, in Regents oftlie University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), no majority spoke on the validity of the applicable regula·
tions. Justice Powell did not discuss the issue at all./d at 269-324 (opinion of Powell, J.). The Brennan
coalition noted only tliat one regulation was consistent witli tlie emphasis of title VI on voluntary
remedial action. ld at 345 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). The remaining
justices found tlie HEW regulations irrelevant to tlie case./d at 418 n.22 (opinion of Stevens, J., with
Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.).
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upheld HEW's standards.278 Justice Stewart first quoted the principle that regulations are acceptable so long as they are "reasonably related to the purposes
of the enabling legislation."279 He then added, however, that the regulations
represent a "consistent administrative construction" of remedial legislation,
and thus are entitled to great weight in interpreting the antidiscrimination language of section 601.280 The Lau concurrence in effect adopted as a second
consideration the administrative law test used under title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,2Bl which assigns weight to consistent agency interpretations of
vague statutory language.2s2
An examination of the legislative history of title VI, however, shows that
Justice Stewart should have omitted the second consideration. "Discrimination" in section 601 is no vague term to be defined once authoritatively and
frozen into law; rather, it is a broad term that Congress deliberately chose to
provide a basis for an evolving agency policy expressed through administrative
rulemaking authority. HEW Secretary Celebrezze informed those conducting
the hearings on title VI that he intended to adopt expansive definitions of discrimination to root out underlying social problems.283 The committee responded not by curbing agencies altogether, but by requiring them to adopt
regulations in advance so that grantees would "know what they can and cannot do." 284 The analogy to title VII, in which Congress refused to give such
power to the affected agency, is therefore inapposite.285
Justice Stewart's alternative test, requiring a reasonable relation tQ legislative purposes, is a workable approach only with the proviso that the legislative
purpose of title VI was to permit an evolving definition of discrimination. 286 A
simpler and preferable solution is to recognize that when Congress delegated
broad power to agencies to define discrimination it was following the guide of
earlier legisl.ation directing agencies to act "in the public interest"287 or to con278. 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J., concurring in result).
279. Id.
280. I d. (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972)). The Brennan
coalition in Bakke took the same approach. 438 U.S. at 342 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall &
Blackmun, JJ.) (citingLau). Its reasoning, however, appears inconsistent: title VI cannot be both coextensive with the Constitution, in the court's view, and yet also be free for interpretation by agencies.
281. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
282. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976) (declining to give weight to EEOC
guideline contradicting earlier agency position and conflicting with other indicia of proper interpretation of title VII). The degree of weight that courts accord an agency's construction of legislation has
been a controversial issue since at least 1941. See Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941) (judicial
review of agency interpretation of statutory term ends if construction 'just and reasonable"); 1 K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 30.10 (1958) (discussing Gray); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW§§ 232-37 (1976) (same). The standard of "great deference" apparently supplies modem
courts with the flexibility necessary to apply the Gray doctrine under title VII. Because, as stated below,
title VI expressly authorizes agencies to define "discrimination" rather than merely to construe the
statute, the issue in Gray should not arise in title VI cases.
283. See notes 180-82 supra and accompanying text (discussing Celebrezze testimony).
284. See note 209 supra and accompanying text (quoting Attorney General Kennedy at House subcommittee hearings).
285. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 & n.20 (1976) (EEOC may issue procedural
regulations, but non-procedural rules merit less weight); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1976) (EEOC may
issue regulation to govern intra-agency affairs; no general rulemaking authority).
286. If this proviso were not adopted, the Gray problem discussed in note 282 supra would be raised.
287. See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1976) (requiring finding on record that licensed
facilities be in public interest) (transferred to Department of Energy, 16 U.S.C. § 797 (Supp. III 1979));
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trol "unreasonable" practices.288 Such a delegation is not unconstitutionally
vague, 289 and any other unfairness was addressed by Congress in provisions
requiring presidential approval of regulations, advance publication, and congressional review of agency action before imposition of final sanctions. Thus
read, title VI created an evolutionary model, whereby an agency can change its
definition of discrimination to meet the needs of the time.
2. Consequences of the Open-Ended Standard of Review
The phrases "open-ended" and "evolving" may be misleading because they
connote the liberal direction which such words have taken in contemporary
constitutionallaw.290 But title VI is ordinary legislation,291 and any changing
administrative standards may be either more or less protective than constitutional rules of the day. One administration may study a topic and decide that
"effects" discrimination poses a serious problem; a different administration
may reach a contrary solution in light of new evidence, changed circumstances,
or even changed appreciations ofwrongs.292 Justice Stewart's approach in Lau
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307 (1976) (authorizing agency to act for "public convenience, interest or necessity"). See also Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428, 450 (1967)
(interpreting Federal Power Act); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943)
(interpreting Communications Act of 1934).
288. See Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1074 (Supp. III 1979) (prohibiting "unreasonable
discrimination" by common carriers); Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, § 2(a),
56 Stat. 23 (1942) (agency control of unreasonable prices must be "fair and equitable"). See also American Trucking Ass'n v. Atchison, T. & St. F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 411 (1967) (intrepreting Interstate
Commerce Act); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-24 (1944) (interpreting Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942).
289. Title VI does not impinge on individual liberties, which could invalidate a broad delegation.
See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1967) (dictum) (ordinance delegating to
commission broad power to grant or withhold demonstration permits raises substantial constitutional
issues and may be void if applied too broadly). Nor does it intrude on powers that the Constitution
vests exclusively in Congress and prohibits it from delegating. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-94
(1892) (statute enabling President to levy tariffs on foreign commerce not unconstitutional because not
delegation oflegislative power, but only of power to determine facts on which law depends); cf. Fahey
v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245,250 (1947) (agency may not create new crimes); 1 K. DAVIS, Sllpra note 282,
§ 204 (1958) (discussing penal regulations). Title VI does not extend regulatory authority over society
as a whole, but only over those who have accepted "government largesse." q. National Cable TeleVJ·
sion Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974) (agency may impose fee on party benefiting
from agency regulation). An agency may reasonably expect a benefiting party to conform to its regulations. q. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (f936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(Court will not pass on constitutionality of statute at instance of one who has availed himself of its
benefits).
Title VI does not establish any one agency to enforce the statute and to develop special expertise in
antidiscrimination efforts. Instead, Congress has chosen to rely on the expertise of each agency in
assessing the problems of discrimination within its subject-matter area. Perhaps most important, the
range of agency discretion, as Congress understood it, is fairly narrow and intelligible: agencies can
choose to focus on either intentional racial discrimination or on "effects" racial discrimination, or on
both. These phrases provide a sufficient guide for agencies acting under title VI and its analogues. See
generally 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 282, § 2.01 (discussing doctrine prohibiting delegation of power to
agencies without adequate standards).
290. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (Douglas, J.) ("Notions of what
constitutes equal treatment do change") (citing Brown 1).
291. Because Congress has exercised its spending power, rather than fourteenth amendment power,
in enacting title VI, there is no occasion to discuss the "ratchet" conception that would invalidate any
legislation which is less protective than constitutional standards. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
249 n. 31 (1970); Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret /Jue Process and Equal Protection, 21 STAN.
L. REv. 603, 606 (1975).
292. q. text accompanying note 136 supra (demonstrating that Brennan coalition in Bakke recog·
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would freeze all initial determinations; 293 the evolutionary model does not.
The evolutionary solution might introduce political elements into title VI.
Congress foresaw that possibility, however, and attached primarily political
safeguards to the regulatory authority. Replacement of an earlier regulation
requires presidential approval,294 with all the political repercussions from
Congress29S and the public at large which that entails.296 That the political
branches might acquiesce in such a change was the price Congress chose to
pay when it decided to allow administrative movement in title VI rather than
tying it to judicially fixed-or judicially varying-doctrine.
C.

I.

COURTS AND GUIDELINES-AND OTHER INFORMAL DECISIONS

Standard of Review

Section 602 authorizes agencies to issue "rules, regulations, and orders of
general applicability."297 Soon after enactment of title VI and the passage of
the first regulations under it, federal agencies began to issue "guidelines" and
other interpretive memoranda, elaborating on the regulations. 298 The argument that this practice illegally subverts the presidential approval requirement299 appears untenable. First, in the Stennis Amendment, Congress
recognized and condoned the practice.300 In addition, legislative history
reveals that Congress, in the Lindsay Amendment, did not intend to require
presidential approval of all agency standards or decisions, but only ·those of
"general applicability."301 Moreover, if an agency can interstitially interpret a
presidentially approved regulation in the process of case-by-case administrative adjudication, it should have the power to declare by advance notice its
nized importance of "experience" and "administrative necessity"). In addition, the agency may consider, but is not bound by, "evolving judicial doctrine." 438 U.S. at 337.
293. See 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J. & B1ackmun, J., concurring) (to be valid,
regulations must conform to purpose of act).
294. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976). The authority of an agency merely to rescind a regulation without
authority is unclear. C.f. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., with Burger,
CJ., Stewart & Stevens, JJ., concurring) (unreviewable political question whether President may aorogate treaty ratified by Senate); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane)
(agency may not refuse to enforce title VI). The purpose of Congress' demand for presidential approval, see note 217 supra, also rules out delegation of authority to less politically visible officers. See
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 512-25 (1974) (warrant approval power non-delegable).
295. See notes 230-53 supra and accompanying text (noting previous responses to enforcement
changes).
296. See Bickel, "Realistic, Sensible,,, (II}, NEw REPUBLIC, April 4 & 11, 1970 (reflecting EOlitical
commentators' reaction to President Nixon's stand on school desegregation); Osborne, Payingfor Integration, NEW REPUBLIC, June 6, 1970, at 10 (same); Osborne, School Statement (I}, NEw REPUBLIC,
April 4 & 11, 1970, at 13 (same).
297. 42 u.s.c. § 2000d-l (1976).
298. Dunn, supra note 68, at 44; cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (illustrating supplementary detail provided by bilingual education guidelines). For a sample of these interpretive materials,
see notes 275-76 supra.
299. See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Matthews, 562 F.2d 914, 926 (4th Cir. 1977) (en
bane) (Widener, J., dissentmg in part) (HEW guidelines undermining national standard possible only
with presidential approval), vacated and remandedper curiam on other grounds, 571 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir.
1978) (en bane).
300. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6(c) (1976) (section should not be construed to diminish duty to comply
with title VI guidelines); note 240 supra and accompanying text (discussing passage of Stennis
Amendment).
301. 110 CoNG. REc. 2499-500 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Lindsay replying to Rep. Poll).
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plans for interpretation and application of the regulation. 302 That is what the
guidelines and informal opinions purport to do.
Nevertheless, guidelines should not receive the same deference that courts
accord to regulations. Absence of presidential approval of guidelines does not
invalidate them, but it does leave them without the strong political controls
attending promulgation of regulations. More importantly, the legislative history discloses that Congress provided the safeguard of judicial review 303 specifically to ensure that agency action conform to the regulations. 304 The
guidelines, therefore, should conform to the standard that Justice Stewart appeared to demand of regulations inLau. 305 Guidelines deserve weight in interpreting ambiguous regulations, but they may not serve, as do regulations, to
start the process of substantively defining discrimination.306 To allow otherwise would defeat the political controls attending promulgation of
regulations.307
2. Consequences of the Standard of Review
Although guidelines should not serve as substitutes for regulations, it is
sometimes difficult to determine whether a guideline is independently introducing new considerations, or is merely elaborating on considerations already
present in the underlying regulation. In the context of title VI, however, it is
apparent that if a guideline established either an intent or effects test for the
first time, it would be invalid as a substitute for regulation.
Congress was well aware that the administration might use its title VI au302. The Lindsay-Poff colloquy, id, indicates that Congress understood that the general regulations
would need to be applied to particular situations. Such specific application would involve by itself a
measure of interpretive authority. See generally 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 282, § 30.11 (application of
rules in particularized circumstances).
303. 42 u.s.c. § 2000d-2 (1976).
304. See House Comm. Hearings_ supra note 51, at 2765-66 (remarks of Rep. Mathias in colloquy
with Attorney General Kennedy) (expressing concern with breadth of regulation-making authority).
305. 414 U.S. at 571; see Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Matthews, 562 F.2d 914, 922 n.6
(4th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (requiring strict agency compliance with own regulations for protection of
parties), vacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 511 F.2d 1273 (en bane); cj: Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (agencies must follow own regulations affecting individual rights); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957) (Secretary of State must act in accordance with own department
regulations). This may have been the focus of Justice Stewart's concurrence in Lau, a focus blurred by
the Justice's collapsing of the tiers of regulation and guidelines. See 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., with
Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J., concurring) (applying HEW guidelines to standard of validity for
regulations).
306. The same problem arises in an administrative proceeding when the presiding agency officer
must apply a regulation without benefit of published guidelines or other interpretive memoranda. An
administrative law judge has no authority, as would the agency at the regulation-making stage, to range
widely in defining "discrimination." See OFFICE OF STANDARDS, POLICY, AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT CASE-RELATED MEMORANDA (1979) (discussing application of agency regulations to particular situations) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal). See also note 294 supra (no delegation permitted).
307. Once guidelines or other policy determinations reveal an agency's specific interpretation and
enforcement rules, the only remaming problem is how a court should review an agency's findings of
fact. Following common administrative law principles, see Steadman v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n,
101 S. Ct. 999, 1004-05, 1008 (1981) (in absence of explicit procedural standards for agency proceedings, courts have discretion to define standard, considering intent of agency and agency practice), the
standard of review here should be the "substantial evidence" test. See note 206 supra {legislative history specifies this standard).
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thority to control "racial imbalance."308 That possibility prompted the sponsors to assure Congress that the executive would exercise its power in
compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, and to accept the Lindsay
Amendment requiring presidential approval of proposed regulations. These
congressional safeguards can be effective only if the agency makes the crucial
choice of which test to use at the regulation stage rather than in the guidelines.309 Once the agency has adopted a regulatory test for discrimination, the
degree of latitude the agency may exercise at the guidelines stage will depend
upon which test the agency has chosen.

Intent-Focused Regulations.

If the regulations adopt the intentional discrimination standard, one might expect fact-finding ·to be the agencies' only
remaining concem.310 The mere existence of an intent standard does not indicate, however, what procedures may be used to divine intent. For example,
although the Court has at times held that under an intent test the burden is on
the plaintiff to prove that the alleged discrimination was intentional, 311 it has
failed to apply this approach uniformly in both constitutionaP 12 and statutebased cases.313 Indeed, any procedures designed to enforce the intent test
would be permissible under the standard of review for guidelines.314 Accordingly, an agency might specify by guideline that a complainant could use disparate effects to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination,
placing the burden of rebutting on the grantee.3 15
Under intent-standard regulations, however, the agency could not go further
and adopt through guidelines the per se test of impact discrimination. This
test uses statistical disparities not as an evidentiary aid to divining intent, but
as a substantive definition of the legal wrong. 316 Popularized by Professor

308. See notes 173-79 supra and accompanying text (discussing possibility that title VI could prohibit racial imbalance).
309. If the President should approve a "guideline" and have it published, this decision could be
made at the guidelines stage. It is not the label that is important, of course, but what has occurred at
the rulemaking stage. C.f. note 276 supra (same problem).
310. See note 307 supra.
311. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977)
(burden on complainant to prove that discriminatory intent motivating factor in challenged action).
312. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,495-96 (1977) (allowing plaintiff to establish prima facie
case of intentional discrimination in grand jury selection using statistics; shifting burden to state to
rebut presumption).
313. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093-95 (1981) (after
title VII plaintiff makes prima facie case, defendant bears burden of showing possible nondiscriminatory reasons for actions); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 339
(1977) (plaintiff in title VII action bears initial burden of establishing prima facie case of discrimination, shifting to defendant burden of rebutting inference); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973) (same).
314. See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 372-74 (1973) (remedial administrative rule acceptable if it "implements the objectives of the Act").
315. See Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093-94 (1981) (similar
procedural rules for proving intent, when intent is relevant in title VII cases).
316. The Supreme Court, in Board of Education v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979), recognized the distinction between an evidentiary effects test and a per se effects test. I d at 143-44. It's subsequent
remark that the prima facie case proved under the evidentiary related test could be rebutted by proof of
educational necessity, however, showed some confusion concerning exactly what evidence is adduced
under that test. See id at 151.
As popularized by Professor Ely, see Ely, supra note 172, at 1292, and as used in one class of title VII
cases, see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981) (disparate treatment·
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Brest in 1970,317 and apparently read into title VII in Griggs v. .Duke Power
Company,3 18 this test is so unconcerned with intent that even non-racial benign intentions are considered irrelevant.31 9 Under the test, racial imbalance
constitutes discrimination per se.320 Employment of such a test at the guidelines stage, if the regulations had adopted an intent test, would be unreasonable and ultra vires321 because it would contradict the intent-focused definition
adopred at the presidentially approved level of rulemaking.

Effects-Focused Regulations.
In simplest terms, the problems here are
identical to those discussed above. If the regulations adopted an effects standard for discrimination, it would appear that agency guidelines using an intent
test would be invalid. As noted under the previous subsection, however, the
overlap between intent tests and effects tests permits a role for effects anlysis
under an intent-focused regulation. 322 Can the same be said for an intent-focused guideline under an effects-type regulation?
Essentially the problems is this: if an agency adopts an effects analysis
through proper regulations, the question remains whether it has adopted the
evidentiary effects test or the per se effects test. 323 The very phrasing of the
semantic problem suggests that the agency should have the power to construe
its effects test at the guidelines stage to eliminate any ambiguity, and reviewing
courts should accord great deference to that construction.
Equally relevant at this stage, however, is the earlier conclusion that although agencies have wide authority to define, and everi periodically to change
their definition of, discrimination by regulation, they have no such power
case), the evidentiary effects test searches ultimately for evidence of intent. The Court in Harris,
though, analogizing to the separate Griggs line of title VII cases, see note 318 i'!fra, appeared to understand the test as requiring a court to balance any compelling justifications for discnminatory action
against any unintended harm actually caused. 444 U.S. at 141.
This discussion follows the traditional approach and combines the rebuttable effects test with the per
se, or irrebuttable, effects test because both tests determine the existence of discrimination through the
use of statistics demonstrating that an action has a discriminatory effect. The former incorporates a
balancing of competing interests-permitting some interests to outweigh discriminatory effects-while
the latter does not. An evidentiary effects test, on the other hand, uses discriminatory effects only as a
mechanism for proving discriminatory intent. For purposes of title VI, both the Harris version of the
evidentiary effects test and the per se test define discrimination by reference to effects; the traditional
evidentiary effects test, on the other hand, defines discrimination ultimately by reference to intent.
317. See Brest, supra note 172, at llO {impact alone may trigger demand for justification of actions),
318. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (employment prerequisite not job
related and having discriminatory impact prohibited under title VII).
319. Id. at 432.
320. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968)
(unintentional discriminatory impact of urban renewal program violates equal protection clause). such
discrimination may occasionally be justified, but the court's focus is always on impact as such, not on
good intentions. See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1288 (5th Cir. 1971), ajfd en bane per
curiam, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (compelling state interest may justify state-caused discriminatory
effect).
321. One might argue that the per se effects test is permissible here as a mere procedural device
establishing a conclusive presumption of intentional discrimination, thus tying the effects test to the
implementation of intent-standard regulations. Making the presumption conclusive, however, changes
the ultimate focus of the regulation from intent to impact; that choice must be made by the president at
the regulationmaking stage. See note 309 supra and accompanying text.
322. See text accompanying note 315 supra (use of effects to establish prima facie case of intentional
discrimination appropriate).
323. See note 316 supra (former uses effects as evidence of intent; latter defines discrimination in
terms of effects).
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when making guidelines. Accordingly, as Justice Stewart observed, the guidelines may only construe the rule of law already announced, not make new
law,3 24 and as Justice Rehnquist concluded in a related context, agencies may
use their power of authoritative construction only once.325
These conclusions are important because HEW and its successor departments326 have construed their wide-ranging regulations to focus on effects per
·Se rather than on effects as evidence ofintent.327 The Court has similarly understood the guidelines as so interpreting the regulations. 328 Thus, any effort to
substitute an intent test could be accomplished only by promulgating new presidentially approved regulations.
Silent Regulations.
If the regulation is silent on ·the choice of an intent
or impact definition for discrimination,329 what authority can the agency exercise in adopting a test at the guidelines stage? Because no presidentially approved decision was made by regulation, one conclusion would be that none
should be made by guidelines not subject to presidential approval. A preferable approach, however, would be to conclude that because such a regulation
proscribes at least some discrimination, and absent a presidential showing of
courage, courts should deem the regulati~ns to permit only the less intrusive
test of discrimination. Although debate is possible as to which test is less intru324. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (guidelines entitled to
great weight because department has "reasonably and consistently" interpreted§ 601).
325. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976) (new title VII guideline, inconsistent with previous agency position, entitled to little weight in construing act).
326. The current regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) continue to
use an effects-oriented definition of discrimination. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1980) (grantees may not
"utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the ejfrct of subjecting individuals to discrimination") (emphasis added); id. § 80.3(b)(3) (grantee may not "make selections with the ejfrct" of subjecting individuals to discrimination) (emphasis added). The same is true of the regulations of the
Department of Education. See 45 Fed. Reg. 30,802, 30,918-19 (1980) (to be codified in 34 C.F.R.
§§ ]00.3(b)(2), .3(b)(3) (1981)) (same language as HHS regulations); cf. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.3(b)(2), .3(b)(3)
(1979) (original HEW regulations containing same language).
327. See I OFFICE OF STANDARDS, POLICY AND RESEARCH, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT CASE-RELATED MEMORANDA 9-13 (December 1981) (closure of hospitals violates title VI if it has "disproportionate adverse [racial] effect" on
program beneficiaries unless "necessary" to further program objective and there is no alternative with
lesser disproportionate impact); OFFICE OF STANDARDS, POLICY AND RESEARCH, OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT CASE-RELATED MEMORANDA 10-11 (April & May 1979) (admissions tests having "disproportionate impact on minority candidates" unacceptable unless validated).
328. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1971) (under bilingual education guidelines discriminatory effect per se discrimination; affirmative duty arises to eliminate adverse effect).
A recognition that Lau interpreted the guidelines to establish a per se effects test eliminates some of
the confusion regarding how to apply the effects test. In NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W.
2032 (3d Cir. June 29, 1981) (en bane), the Third Circuit considered the two different effects theories
that can apply to title VII cases in an effort to determine the test for title VI. I d. at 2033. The evidentiary effects test employed in some title VII cases is inapposite to a title VI claim because it focuses on
intent. See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978) (burden on plaintiff to prove prima
facie case of intentional discrimination; burden shifts to defendant to justify actions). The per se effects
test used in other title VII cases, however, is relevant because it relies primarily on effects. See International Bhd. ofTeamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335 n.l5 (1977) (dictum) (acknowledging alternative title VII theory in which proof of discriminatory motive unnecessary).
329. Justice Department guidelines have established uniform model standards for regulations under
title VI. Dunn, supra note 68, at 55. All current regulations appear to adopt an effects test. See note 2
supra (listing regulations). There may be no current regulations, therefore, that are silent on choice of
intent or impact.
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sive,330 the legislative history suggests that in 1964 Congress thought the intent
test was less intrusive than the effects test and that adoption of an effects test
would demand a stronger display of presidential will. 331 Consequently, agencies whose regulations are silent should have no more authority at the guidelines stage than those whose regulations adopt an intent test for
discrimination.332
IV.

CoNcLUSION

This investigation of the history of title VI demonstrates the fundamental
misconception of previous arguments as to whether the statute adopts the constitutional "intent" standard or a more probing "effects" test for defining discrimination. Although the path to understanding here is as convoluted as the
plot of an Agatha Christie thriller, the evidence suggests that title VI represented a carefully crafted compromise in the House. An essential linchpin of
that compromise was the decision to grant executive departments and agencies
wide latitude in defining "discrimination." Although later Senate debates contained constitutional rhetoric, the Senate acted, and understood itself to be
acting, on no fresh initiatives and only confirmed the House compromise. Indeed, the very political considerations written into the text of title VI negate
the idea that the Eighty-Eighth Congress saw the statute as resolutely coterminous with constitutional doctrine. No later Congress has overturned that judgment, and subsequent legislation modeled on title VI and protecting women,
handicapped persons, and aged persons, suggests that recent Congresses have
understood the statutory language to authorize agency action against forms of
discrimination not proscribed by the Constitution.
Title VI specifies no definition of "discrimination"; rather, it authorizes departments and agencies to adopt definitions appropriate for their respective
programs. This notion of wide administrative discretion may be unfashionable today, 333 but it was not so regarded by Congress in 1964. In those less
cynical days "administrative expertise" was more than a myth and trust in
bureaucrats more than a naive and defeated political program.334 Even the
statute's principal check on bureaucratic excess, presidential approval of regu330. Some might believe that the intent test is very intrusive, because it examines normally sacrosanct mental processes and personal thoughts. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 984, 995 (2d Cir.
1977) (discovery seeking to establish journalist's motive in libel case impermissible inquiry into
thoughts and opinions), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(2) (mental processes of counsel privileged). The effects test, on the other hand, measures objectively verifiable phenomena. The
intent test maY. not be substantially more intrusive than the effects test if effects are used as evidence of
intent. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,267-68 (1977)
(allowing use of objective evidence of effect to prove intent).
331. See text accompanying notes 177-91 supra (criticism ofCelebreeze testimony concerning racial
imbalance).
332. See text accompanying note 315 supra (discussing guideline authority of agencies under intent
regulations). The same conclusions would also apply to title IX regulations and guidelines because
those regulations are also subject to presidential approval. See note 257 supra (quoting text of title IX).
333. See Neustadt, The Administration's Regulatory Reform Program: An Overview, 32 AD. L. REV.
129, 131 (1980) (explaining erosion of public support for government regulation); Proceedings of lite
National Co'!ference on Federal Regulation/ Roads to Reform, Panel IV: Improving the Administrative
Process-Timefora NewAPA, 32 AD. L. REv. 287,294 (1980) (Judge Leventhal stating that populist
mood against technical bureaucrats).
334. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1890 (remarks of Chairman Celler) ("title VI
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lations defining discrimination, reflected congressional reliance primarily on
political rather than judicial safeguards.
This new investigation into the origins of title VI suggests that solving the
problem of how courts should deal with the statute requires a fundamental
recasting of the problem. Because Congress adopted a regulatory model for
title VI, administrative, rather than constitutional, law provides the framework
for analysis. Thus, courts should accord agencies wide definitional power in
formulating regulations approved by the President. They should recognize no
such power, however, when agencies initially seek to define discrimination by
unapproved guidelines or other informal rulemaking. Judicial willingness to
enforce the abuse-control mechanism chosen by Congress-presidential approval of regulations-would render unnecessary the oourts' attempts to bring
agencies to heel by requiring them to echo the court-declared terms of the
Constitution.

offers wide discretion . . . . Those who want to give that kind of discretion will vote for title VI"); id at
2164 (remarks of Rep. Rodino) ("administrators have . . . done a superior job").

